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1. Robert J. Gordon
Experience, some people say, is like a light on a caboose, illuminating
only where we aren't going. But we scrutinize the past for its elements
of prologue, and consolation. [George F. Will, 1979]
2.1 Introduction
The main issues in current discussions of macroeconomic theory and
policy are very different from those of the late 1940s. Most shifts in
economic opinion can be traced to the impact of changing events on
ideas. For example, in some cases the evolution of the economic aggre-
gates helped to decide a debate between schools of thought. In other
cases events occurred that could not be understood within the context
of existing paradigms and required the invention of new explanations.
The most useful framework for an analysis of postwar changes in
macroeconomics is the familiar m/croeconomic dichotomy between de-
mand and supply. Most questions in macroeconomics can be usefully
divided between issues concerning (a) the determinants and control of
aggregate demand and (b) those concerning aggregate supply, that is,
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the factors that influence the division of changes in aggregate demand
between prices and real output. In the early postwar years macroeco-
nomics was almost exclusively concerned with the explanation of aggre-
gate demand within a Keynesian framework that emphasized the need
for an activist fiscal policy to offset the instability of private spending.
By the end of the 1970s concern with demand management had been
pushed aside by two central supply issues—that of explaining and con-
trolling inflation and that of determining the causes and cures of the
secular slowdown in the growth of aggregate labor productivity that had
occurred in the past decade.
1
Until 1973 the central area of macroeconomic controversy was the
determination and control of aggregate demand. Two main issues were
the subject of debate: the relative potency of monetary and fiscal policy
and the case for the activist use of discretionary policy as contrasted
with a nonactivist policy stance relying on rules. Opinions on the first
question shifted almost continuously, from the heavy emphasis on fiscal
policy and low regard for monetary policy common in the late 1940s,
to an intermediate view that incorporated both monetary and fiscal pol-
icy in discussions of the late 1950s and early 1960s, to a common ten-
dency after 1968 to doubt the potency of fiscal policy and assign a
strong causal role for monetary changes as initiating fluctuations in
aggregate demand growth.
The debate between activists and nonactivists revolved around three
further issues: differing beliefs in the inherent stability of private spend-
ing, differing beliefs in the potency of price flexibility as an automatic
self-correcting force to offset the impact of instability in spending, and
differing degrees of trust or distrust in the feasibility of stabilizing gov-
ernment policy actions. The fiscal-monetary and activist-nonactivist de-
bates revolved around logically separate sets of issues. It would have
been possible, for instance, to believe that monetary policy was potent
and fiscal policy impotent to control aggregate demand, and yet still be
in favor of activist monetary policy intervention. Nevertheless, Ameri-
can economists tended to coalesce around either a fiscal-activist or mon-
etary-nonactivist position, with the adjective "Keynesian" often applied
to the first group and "monetarist" to the second. Because they tended
to believe in the potency both of money's impact on spending and of
price flexibility as an automatic stabilizing mechanism, monetarists
tended to put more emphasis than Keynesians on variations in monetary
growth as the most important cause of variations in the inflation rate,
as summarized in Milton Friedman's famous dictum that "inflation is
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" (1963).
During most of the period before 1973 the intellectual tide shifted in
a monetarist direction, both toward a belief in the potency of money
and in the defects of policy activism. But since 1973 the advent of
supply shocks as a major destabilizing force has caused the monetarist103 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
tide to ebb. Supply shocks not only erode the case for the monetarist
"rule" that money should grow at a constant rate, but they also open
up a new role for fiscal policy in the form of cost-oriented changes in
taxes and subsidies to counteract the effect of supply shocks on the
overall price level. One element of the monetarist credo—distrust of
government actions—remained strongly intact as the decade of the 1970s
drew to a close, since the major impact of tax changes had thus far been
to raise costs and prices and aggravate economic instability.
A review of the interaction between macroeconomic events and ideas
over the 1947-79 era can be organized either by topic or by chrono-
logical period. This paper begins by comparing the behavior of impor-
tant aggregate variables across four subperiods of the postwar era in
order to identify the major changes that call for an explanation and that
have been the source of changing ideas and doctrines. Subsequently the
four subperiods (1947-57, 1957-67, 1967-73, and 1973-79) are ex-
amined in more detail. For each interval we identify the economic ideas
about which there was a consensus at the beginning of the period, then
examine major economic events and trace the impact of unexpected
changes on the evolution of theory, policy, and private behavior. We
regularly take advantage of historical hindsight by forming judgments
on policy mistakes and the desirability of alternative policy actions.
2.2 Essential Features of the Postwar Era
The most important features of the postwar era are well known. In
contrast to the century before World War II, the postwar economy has
been characterized by much less instability in real output and unemploy-
ment together with a tendency toward chronic and persistent inflation.
The growth of aggregate demand has been both faster and more stable
during the postwar years, with no instance after 1949 in which annual
nominal GNP growth actually declined. On the supply side, the respon-
siveness of prices to fluctuations in nominal GNP growth has gradually
diminished (Cagan 1975), and price movements have more and more
exhibited sluggish and inertia-dominated behavior that inhibits policy-
makers from ending inflation through restrictive demand-management
policies. Although the willingness of Americans to accept continuing
inflation might seem astonishing to a visitor from earlier eras, the domi-
nance of decentralized nonsynchronized wage-setting institutions has
given households and firms every incentive to protect themselves against
inflation rather than take unilateral action to stop inflation.
2.2.1 The Demand Side
Major features of the postwar era can be traced with the aid of table
2.1, which compares growth rates and ratios of important economic
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and 1979. The averages for all series before 1947 are shown in column
4, and since 1947 in column 9. The table first examines variables rele-
vant for the determination of aggregate demand growth and then exam-
ines the growth of nominal GNP from the supply side. Finally, several
ratios are shown, including the mean and standard deviation of the GNP
gap and the unemployment rate, as well as the share of investment and
government spending in GNP.
It is easiest to think of "aggregate demand" as final sales measured
in current dollars, or "nominal final sales." This concept is equal to
nominal GNP minus inventory change. Because inventory changes are
unimportant over the long intervals examined in table 2.1, line I.A.I
shows the growth rates of nominal GNP itself. It is evident that nominal
GNP since 1947 has grown at almost double the rate of the earlier
1923-47 period, and that the difference is even more pronounced if
World War II is ignored. Another important feature is the similarity of
the growth rates of nominal GNP in the first two postwar subperiods,
followed by a substantial acceleration during each of the last two sub-
periods. Thus, rapid and accelerating growth in aggregate demand stands
as one of the most important features of the postwar era.
When we search for an explanation of the four percentage point ac-
celeration in nominal GNP growth between the second and fourth post-
war subperiods, we find in the next line that most can be accounted for
by an acceleration in the growth of the money supply (the M2 defini-
tion). But the behavior of the money supply is of no help at all in
explaining the overall difference between the pre-1947 and post-1947
growth rates of nominal GNP, since monetary growth was exactly the
same in the latter period as in the former. Thus an understanding of the
reasons for the more rapid postwar growth of aggregate demand cannot
simply point to the behavior of money but rather must be based on a
more complete explanation in which monetary and nonmonetary factors
interact.
The gradual shift in the emphasis on money in explanations of aggre-
gate demand behavior in the last fifteen years reflects a transition in the
relationship between nominal GNP and money that occurred at the same
time. The postwar era began with monetary explanations in low repute,
not a surprising development in light of the loose relation between nom-
inal GNP and monetary growth, particularly in the immediate prewar
years 1937-40.
2 During the first decade of the postwar period money
played a relatively small role in explaining movements in nominal GNP,
and the popularity of the Keynesian multiplier paradigm reflected this
fact, with money a mere sideshow forced in most models to exert its full
influence on spending through a narrow interest rate channel. But the
simultaneous acceleration in nominal GNP and monetary growth begin-107 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
ning in the 1960s gained many new advocates of the notion that money
is the prime mover in the determination of aggregate demand.
The traditional multiplier models are built by a "bottom up" proce-
dure that begins with components of spending. Economic instability
originates with "autonomous" components of demand, while a major
portion of consumption is "induced" and plays the passive role of an
obedient child. The motivation for an activist fiscal stabilization policy
is rooted in the belief that consumption fluctuations amplify rather than
dampen the inherently unstable behavior of autonomous spending. Sec-
tion I.A.2 of table 2.1 illustrates the erratic growth rate of nonresiden-
tial fixed investment in the pre-1947 period that provided the impetus
for the dominance of Keynesian thinking, particularly the decade-long
cessation in the growth of investment in the 1930s following the ebul-
lient experience of the 1920s.
While nonresidential fixed investment has exhibited substantial fluc-
tuations on a year-to-year basis throughout the postwar years, the aver-
age growth rates during the first three postwar subperiods exhibit a
remarkable stability. In fact consumer investment (line I.A.2.b) has
been less stable than business investment (line I.A.2.c), although the
growth of both slumped after 1973. Before 1973 federal government
expenditure was the primary source of instability across subperiods in
the postwar era. In contrast to the 1930s when expanding government
expenditures helped to fill the void left by the collapse of investment,
postwar fluctuations in government spending have been an autonomous
source of instability, largely in connection with the Korean and Vietnam
war episodes.
The growing size of government has been associated in recent years
with many evils. Thus it is surprising that when federal spending on
goods and services is combined with that of state and local government,
we find at the bottom of table 2.1 (section II.B) that their share in GNP
exhibited no increase at all between the 1957-67 decade and the most
recent 1973-79 subperiod, after the enormous growth in the share that
occurred between the 1920s and the Korean War. The same section at
the bottom of the table shows the remarkable stability of the average
share of business investment, in contrast to the instability of the share
during the interwar years.
If the share of government spending on goods and services has not
increased in the 1970s, why has so much public attention been focused
on the increasing role of government? The answer lies on the bottom
line of the table (II.B.2.6) in the continuous and steady increase in the
ratio of transfer payments to GNP, which has swollen from a mere 0.7
percent in the 1920s to more than 10 percent during 1973-79. Combin-
ing goods and services with transfer payments, we find that the total108 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
share of government spending has increased from 8.8 percent during
the 1920s to over 30 percent in the 1970s.
While the increased importance of government has debatable alloca-
tive consequences, there can be no doubt that the greater size of govern-
ment has helped to stabilize the level of economic activity. When real
income begins to fall, corporate and individual income tax revenues
drop even faster, while transfer payments are either maintained in the
case of social security or rise in the case of unemployment benefits and
welfare payments. Thus, leaving aside its own contribution to instability
during the Korean and Vietnam wars, government has introduced an
inertia into the quarter-to-quarter changes in spending that may have
made a greater contribution to stability than the commitment to discre-
tionary activism embodied in the Employment Act of 1946.
3
2.2.2 The Supply Side
Two of the most important measures of the nation's economic per-
formance are real GNP and the unemployment rate. Throughout the
postwar era both have been explicit targets of policymakers, and the
actual level of each variable has been compared in public policy discus-
sions to target values for each. In the early postwar years this target of
policy was called "full employment," although policymakers did not set
specific numerical goals for the unemployment rate or real output. Then
in the Kennedy-Johnson era an official "interim full-employment unem-
ployment rate" of 4.0 percent was adopted, and Okun (1962) devised
a simple method to calculate the "potential" real GNP that was com-
patible with this numerical unemployment target. No specific behavior
of inflation was predicted to accompany the state of full employment;
as we shall see, economists in the late 1940s differed regarding the
compatibility of full employment and price stability, while the post-1958
Phillips curve framework explicitly warned that a modest but chronic
inflation might accompany the achievement of full employment.
Milton Friedman's landmark presidential address (1968), together
with two insightful papers by Phelps (1967; 1968) warned that there
was an equilibrium unemployment rate that was independent of the in-
flation rate and outside the control of aggregate demand policy. Fried-
man's label for this equilibrium condition, the "natural" unemployment
rate, was gradually adopted in policy discussions to mean the unemploy-
ment rate below which inflation would continuously accelerate.
4 Statis-
tical studies found that the "natural" unemployment rate was higher
than the previous 4.0 percent target and had risen considerably after
1963. Although in government documents the corresponding level of
real GNP is still called "potential GNP," the overly optimistic record
of past official potential GNP estimates, together with considerations of
symmetry, suggest that the output which the economy is capable of pro-109 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
during at the natural rate of unemployment be called "natural real
GNP," as on line I.B.I of table 2.1.
5
Since 1923 the growth of natural real GNP has fluctuated in a narrow
range, rising from its minimum annual rate of 2.5 percent achieved in
the 1920s to its maximum of 3.7 percent during 1967-73. Actual real
GNP grew somewhat more slowly than natural real GNP during the
1923-47 period and slightly faster thereafter, mainly reflecting the eval-
uation that 1947 did not represent a year of full utilization of capacity.
6
As is shown next in the table, the modest slowdown in the growth of
actual real GNP in the 1970s masks a greater deceleration in the growth
rate of labor productivity (output per hour), due to the fact that hours
have grown rapidly since 1967 while productivity growth has slackened
off. The causes of this slowdown in secular productivity growth have
eluded economists and stand as one of the major unexplained macro-
economic puzzles.
7
The inevitable consequence of the acceleration of nominal GNP
growth during successive postwar subperiods, combined with the slow-
down in real GNP growth, has been an acceleration of inflation that has
exceeded in magnitude the acceleration in nominal GNP growth. The
entire postwar period has been characterized by a steady rise in prices
that has no precedent in the history of the previous two centuries and is
made even more remarkable by the observation that the consumer price
level was no higher in 1940 than in 1778 (David and Solar 1977, p.
16). While the acceleration of inflation in the 1960s appears to be
largely the result of faster monetary growth, the further upsurge in the
1970s cannot be explained solely by the behavior of the money supply.
Inflation, however, cannot be treated merely as a "residual" that by
definition equals the difference between nominal GNP and real GNP
growth; the acceleration of nominal GNP growth and deceleration of
real GNP growth in the 1970s were not two completely independent and
exogenous processes. Real output behavior can be influenced by the
inflation rate through at least two routes. First, for any given growth rate
of nominal GNP, more rapid inflation cuts real GNP growth and tends
to induce a recession, reducing the ratio of actual to natural real GNP.
Second, inflation has effects on the growth rate of natural real GNP it-
self, especially when most tax legislation is stated in nominal terms.
Inflation tends to raise the real effective corporate tax rate, thus curbing
the incentive to purchase business plants and equipment. Through this
and other channels, inflation may be partly responsible for the decline
in the growth of productivity and in real natural GNP during the latter
part of the 1970s, although recent studies indicate that the slowdown
in investment explains only part of the productivity story.
The final section (II) of table 2.1 displays means and standard devia-
tions of two measures of the utilization of resources, the "gap" between110 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
actual and natural output, and the unemployment rate. These measures
contrast the enormous waste of resources during the 1929-41 decade
with the much more intensive and stable utilization experience of the
postwar years. The closeness of the subperiod mean values of the gap
before 1973 to a zero value and the reduction of its standard deviation
after 1977 is evident. The subperiod unemployment rate figures have
tended to drift upward during the postwar years, reflecting the gradual
shifting of the estimated natural unemployment rate used in the defini-
tion of natural real GNP, i.e., the unemployment rate considered com-
patible with the maintenance of stable inflation. An apparent anomaly
(to be explored below) is the marked acceleration of inflation after 1973
despite a relatively slack utilization experience; this suggests either that
the true level of natural real GNP may be even lower than assumed in
the table, or that there is more to the avoidance of inflation than achiev-
ing a zero real GNP "gap."
8 For instance a supply shock can simultane-
ously boost the inflation rate and cause a contraction in real output
relative to natural output.
9
The higher and more stable level of the utilization of resources in the
postwar years has been accompanied not just by faster inflation on
average, but also by less variability of prices than in earlier decades.
Although prices could be counted upon to fall in prewar recessions,
there has been no actual decline in the GNP deflator (measured as a
four-quarter change) since 1949. Just as the greater role of government
has introduced an inertial tendency into aggregate demand behavior, so
the greater confidence by firms and workers that severe setbacks will be
avoided has led to an inertial tendency in United States wage and price
behavior.
Several important shifts in events and ideas stand out in this initial
review of postwar trends. First, the increased correspondence between
the growth rates of nominal GNP and money, in contrast to their much
looser connection before 1947, helps to explain the emergence of mone-
tarism and the diminished emphasis on the simple multiplier framework
for the analysis of demand fluctuations. Second, the growth in the size
of government after 1947 was mainly reflected in transfer payments
rather than goods and services. Increases in transfers, and in the taxes
that finance them, both have contributed to economic stability and to
taxpayer resistance that has recently increased support for conservative
politicians. Third, after 1967 the growth of labor productivity deceler-
ated markedly, with the growth in natural real GNP buoyed only by
rapid growth in hours. Together with the relatively high and stable level
of utilization of resources achieved during most of the postwar period,
the emergence of rapid inflation naturally shifted concern among econo-
mists and laymen from finding cures for unemployment to coping with
inflation and its consequences. The role of supply shocks in contributingIll Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
to the high and unstable inflation rate of the 1970s, together with the
slowdown in secular productivity growth, created a tilt in the concern
and attention of economic thinking toward aggregate supply problems
from the dominance of aggregate demand issues that characterized mac-
roeconomics in the postwar years until the mid-1960s.
2.3 The First Postwar Decade, 1947-57
2.3.1 The Conceptual Framework
The central paradigm of macroeconomics as it emerged from the
Second World War was the Keynesian multiplier theory and its endorse-
ment of an activist fiscal policy to overcome the inherent instability of
private investment. Monetary theory lurked in the shadows, ignored by
most economists except in academic exercises based on the simplified
Hicksian IS-LM apparatus that allowed an instructor to demonstrate how
a low interest elasticity of investment or a high interest elasticity of the




The major event that had discredited monetary policy was the juxta-
position between early 1938 and late 1940 of a weak economic recovery,
explosive monetary growth, complete price rigidity, and a short-term
interest rate that had dropped close to zero. Despite a monetary growth
rate that was rapid and constant between early 1938 and late 1941, the
economy's recovery floundered until defense spending began in earnest
in late 1940, after which real GNP suddenly jumped by almost 20 per-
cent in a single year, a chronology that ingrained a deep-seated belief
in the potency of fiscal policy and the "pushing on a string" analogy for
monetary policy. The acceptance of Keynesian doctrine led in turn to a
retrospective deemphasis on the role of monetary factors in the Great
Contraction of 1929-33, a view that now appears largely accurate for
1929-31 but seriously misleading for 1931-33.
n
By current standards monetary policy received little attention in the
contemporary literature of the late 1940s. Money was not ignored to-
tally, and many economists took note of the fact that the quantity of
nominal money had tripled between 1940 and 1945. The enormous
wartime increase in the quantity of money might not avert a postwar
depression, however, because the experience of the late 1930s had dem-
onstrated that "idle currency and idle bank deposits do not bid up prices.
Someone has to spend to do this. The amount of cash and other liquid
assets possessed by the public constitutes only one of the factors that
influence the rate of the public's spending" (Seltzer 1945, p. 832).
Nevertheless, despite the loose connection between money and income,
"there is great risk that the deflationary effects of a radical rise in inter-112 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
est rates might be so severe as to throw the whole economy into a crush-
ing business depression" (p. 844).
This curious inconsistency, with a monetary expansion viewed as
impotent and a monetary contraction viewed as too dangerously potent
to risk, helped to maintain support for the Federal Reserve's policy of
pegging the government bond rate in the late 1940s. Memories looked
back not only to the period of monetary impotence in the late 1930s,
but also the period after World War I when the economy plunged into
a sharp recession in 1920 despite the doubling of the nominal money
supply during the war. So great was the influence of the 1919-21 ex-
perience (and earlier postwar deflations) that the panel of business econ-
omists surveyed by Joseph Livingston (Carlson 1977, p. 33) expected
a postwar deflation for six successive semiannual forecasts despite the

























In retrospect the exaggerated fears of a postwar depression, with pre-
dictions of eight million postwar unemployed common during 1945,
reflected a failure to notice a crucial difference between the World War I
and World War II experience. While the nominal money supply doubled
between 1915 and 1920, price controls were sufficiently weak to allow
the GNP deflator also to double, leaving the real money supply in 1920
slightly below its 1915 value. Controls on prices during World War II
were tight enough to limit the 1940-45 increase in the GNP deflator to
30 percent, thus allowing the real quantity of money almost to double.
As a result the postwar inflation was both inevitable and necessary to
achieve a reduction in real balances. Similar statements can be made
about the real public debt, which more than tripled between 1940 and
1945. In the context of the swing in opinion from the Keynesian to
monetarist paradigm in the late 1960s, we might note that greater atten-
tion to the distinction between real and nominal magnitudes would have
been helpful in the 1940s as well.
Issues involving aggregate supply received much less attention than
those involving the determination and control of aggregate demand. Im-
plicit or explicit in most discussions of aggregate supply was a knife-edge
model describing an economy that suffered from either a "deflationary113 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
gap" or an "inflationary gap" but was rarely at the delicate point of
balance between them. The "gap" terminology was itself ambiguous be-
cause a "deflationary gap" was accompanied not by deflation of prices
but rather by unemployment and fixed prices. Once again the experience
of the late 1930s had been influential, particularly the period between
mid-193 8 and mid-1940 when an unemployment rate exceeding 15 per-
cent was accompanied by virtually complete price stability.
1
2 The will-
ingness to assume fixed prices in underemployment cut off the private
economy's automatic stabilizing rudder and led to the automatic conclu-
sion that government intervention was necessary to avoid high unem-
ployment.
Inflationary gaps occurred mainly as the result of wars and could be
illustrated on the Keynesian multiplier diagram as the consequence of
fiscal expansion.
1
3 The possibility that unemployment and inflation might
coexist in a normal situation was only rarely considered; the Phillips
curve was still a decade in the future. The unfortunate coincidence of
high unemployment and rising prices in the 1933-37 recovery had not
been adequately explained or integrated into the basic Keynesian ana-
lytical framework.
1
4 On the other hand, the notion that full employment
would bring a transition to an inflationary condition led to considerable
concern about the definition of full employment itself. An incorrect esti-




Perhaps on no topic does hindsight make the state of economic think-
ing in the late 1940s seem as archaic as in the area of productivity and
economic growth. Productivity growth was not viewed primarily as the
wellspring of economic progress, but rather as a source of unemploy-
ment. Excessive productivity growth was cited as explaining the paradox
that in 1940 and 1941 the United States economy produced substantially
more than in 1929 but had a much higher level of unemployment.
1
6 It
was little noticed that the same increase in productivity that had oc-
curred in the 1930s made possible an increase in real private GNP per
hour in 1946 of 43 percent over 1929, the last previous peacetime year
with an unemployment rate below 4 percent. From our uncomfortable
vantage point in the early 1980s with a trend rate of productivity growth
of barely one percent, the ability of the economy to generate a two per-
centage point rate of increase in productivity between 1929 and 1941
must remain something of a mystery in light of the low rate of fixed
investment that occurred during the 1930s. Contemporary critics who
blame our poor productivity performance on government regulation and
on the negative impact of inflation on the incentive to invest stemming
from our nonindexed tax system must wonder how productivity man-
aged to grow during the 1930s at double the rate of 1973-78 in spite
of an investment/GNP ratio only two-thirds as large.114 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
The lack of attention to productivity and long-term economic growth
reflected the obsession with the possibility of underutilized resources and
the doubt that the economy could remain along a full-employment
path.
1
7 The enormous achievements of the United States economy dur-
ing the war must also have impressed economists and others with the
high level of productive efficiency in the United States economy, particu-
larly in contrast to war-ravaged Europe and Japan. Thus supply con-
straints and productivity slid well down on the list of economic concerns
and became relegated to specialized courses in defense economics.
2.3.2 Major Surprises of the First Postwar Decade
Demand Fluctuations
Major events in the first postwar decade were roughly consistent with
the Keynesian multiplier theory of aggregate demand fluctuations. As
illustrated in figure 2.1a, where four-quarter rates of change of nominal
GNP and money (M2) are compared for the 1947-58 interval, mone-
tary growth was much less volatile than that of nominal GNP, so that
shifts in nominal GNP were almost entirely accounted for in an arith-
metic sense by shifts in velocity. In the context of the theoretical IS-LM
paradigm, economic instability stemmed from movements of the IS
curve back and forth along a relatively fixed LM curve.
The Korean War was overwhelmingly the most important source of
economic instability during the 1947-57 decade. The unexpected North
Korean invasion on 24 June 1950 added an explosion of defense spend-
ing on top of an already healthy recovery from the 1949 recession.
While the Korean War was a political surprise, its economic conse-
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tant reason to question prevailing economic doctrine. Surely the greatest
economic surprise of the first postwar decade was the failure of anything
resembling a postwar depression to occur, with mild postwar recessions
in 1949 and 1954 roughly duplicating in magnitude the minor setbacks
of 1924 and 1927. In retrospect the high postwar level of real balances
and real government debt was probably the major factor that prevented
the long-awaited postwar depression from occurring. Monetarists might
note that the downturn in the four-quarter M2 growth rate in 1948:2
occurred two quarters prior to the downturn in nominal GNP growth,
indicating a possible causative role for money, while the absence of any
absolute decline in money during 1949 helped to arrest the economy's
decline. There was no similar pattern in monetary growth that helps to
explain the timing of the 1954 recession. A monetarist might point to
the relatively stable growth performance of M2 between 1951 and 1955
as helping to explain why the 1953-55 decline in defense spending had
such a short-lived impact on the economy and why the 1955 recovery
was so robust.
The Keynesian components-of-expenditure analysis of the timing of
economic fluctuations can be set forth with the aid of table 2.2, which
illustrates shifts in components of real GNP between key quarters during
the first postwar decade. Section B of the table splits real GNP into real
final sales and inventory accumulation and points out that the 1949
recession was so mild that there was no decline at all in real final sales.
The recession was entirely attributable to a small temporary adjustment
in the level of inventories.
An important feature of the 1948-49 episode was the role of govern-
ment spending in prolonging the length of the expansion through the enc*
of 1948 by offsetting the 1947-48 decline in net exports. The mildnes;
of the 1949 setback itself can be attributed not only to the fortuitous
countercyclical swing in total government spending, but also to the tim-
ing of the first major postwar restyling of all "big-three" auto models in
1949. The appeal of the new models boosted real final sales of auto-
mobiles in 1949:2 fully 38 percent above the 1948 average. This epi-
sode stands in contrast to the procyclical swings in auto buying that
marked subsequent recessions.
Since the 1949 recession resulted entirely from inventory behavior, a
recovery in early 1950 was inevitable as soon as the temporary liquida-
tion of inventories ceased. In fact the 1950 expansion was rapid even
before the outbreak of war in June, with consumer investment in autos
and houses at the forefront. Once the war began, consumers who had
vivid memories of wartime shortages rushed to purchase all types of
consumer goods, and the share of consumer durable purchases in real
GNP reached a level (9.2 percent) that was not to be exceeded until
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From late 1950 on, investment by consumers and businessmen fell
back, and the expansion was carried along during its remaining years
by a 279 percent increase in federal spending on goods and services
which peaked—along with the cycle itself—in 1953:2. In real terms the
subsequent recession was more severe than the 1949 episode. Residen-
tial construction, net exports, and state and local government all helped
to stabilize the economy, and the drop in consumer and business fixed
investment was very moderate. The role of monetary policy in convert-
ing residential buildings and state-local government into automatic sta-
bilizers is particularly important; dropping nonmortgage interest rates
caused funds to be channeled into mortgages and state-local borrowing.
Housing starts rose by 40 percent between December 1953 and Decem-
ber 1954, and state-local real spending jumped by 9 percent in a single
year.
1955 was a vintage year for the American economy. The automatic
stabilizers and stable monetary growth policy had prevented the decline
in defense spending from causing a serious setback. With both the Ko-
rean War and the danger of postwar depression in the past, households
and business firms could contemplate a new era of business prosperity
and set out with determination to acquire the higher stock of durable
goods that was consistent with this new level of "peacetime permanent
income." By mid-1955 real investment had jumped to a level 22 percent
higher than had been achieved in the peak 1953 quarter, offsetting
almost dollar-for-dollar the 1953-55 drop in federal spending. Further
evidence of a fundamental change in expectations is provided by the
stock market. The real value of the Standard and Poor's index rose by
102 percent between 1953 and 1959, compared with increases of less
than 40 percent in the preceding and following six-year periods.
The 1955 investment explosion was led by consumer purchases of
automobiles. Paul Samuelson once announced to an M.I.T. graduate
class that he would "flunk anyone who could explain why auto sales in
1955 were so high." A complete quantitative explanation is never likely
to be produced, because several of the sources of the 1955 auto boom
cannot be quantified rigorously. In addition to the basic accelerator
mechanism that makes auto sales depend on the growth of real income,
and the effect on expectations of the mildness of the recession, the boom
was amplified by a substantial easing in installment credit terms that
introduced thirty-six-month installment contracts for the first time, and
also by the timing coincidence that all of the "big three" makes intro-
duced radically new models simultaneously in the 1955 model year for
the first time since 1949.
1
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Between 1955 and 1957 the expansion changed in character. The
countercyclical behavior of residential housing exerted a drag on the
expansion, as did the slump in consumer durable sales from the unsus-118 Robert J. Gordon/ Arthur M. Okim/Herbert Stein
tainable 1955 level. The common practice of referring to the 1955-57
expansion as "an investment boom" is completely misleading. It should
actually be labeled "an export boom," reflecting the 27 percent surge in
real exports between 1955:3 and the post-Suez peak in 1957:1. In con-
trast, real state-local spending rose by 7.6 percent over the same six-
quarter interval, while real business investment grew only 4.4 percent.
Supply Phenomena
Before World War II, price movements mirrored the behavior of
nominal GNP, instantaneously absorbing a substantial fraction of nom-
inal spending changes. For instance, falling prices absorbed 51 percent
of the 1929-33 drop in nominal GNP. In figure 2.1b we find that the
four-quarter rate of change of the GNP deflator shows a similar ten-
dency to mirror nominal GNP changes during the 1947-52 period, with
a timing pattern that is virtually simultaneous. Perhaps the most impor-
tant supply phenomenon of the first postwar decade was the change in
the behavior of prices after 1952; the inflation rate no longer responded
rapidly to nominal GNP change but rather seemed to be dominated by
inertia. Prices hardly responded at all to the spending surge in 1953 and
1955, and to the drop in spending in 1954. Whereas a price decline had
insulated real spending in the 1949 recession, the opposite occurred in
1954 when almost the full brunt of the nominal GNP decline was trans-
lated into real GNP.
After 1954 the inflation rate displayed the pattern that has become so
familiar in the 1960s and 1970s. Price increases responded only slug-
gishly to the behavior of nominal spending, so that the peak 1957 infla-
tion rate in figure 2.1b occurred six quarters after the peak growth in
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the variance of inflation was astonishingly low when viewed from the
perspective of earlier history. The reasons for this shift in behavior have
never been adequately explained. One approach would point to the sta-
bility of expectations of the price level: between December 1954 and
December 1965 the twelve-month rate of expected price increase by the
Livingston panel never went outside the range of zero to 1.25 percentage
points. But this observation is not an explanation, since the main reason
for the stability of expected inflation must have been the stability of
actual inflation.
The assignment of responsibility for the changing behavior of wages
and prices remains an unfinished research task. Cagan's careful analysis
(1975) of the cyclical behavior of wholesale prices in the 1920s and
the postwar years confirms "a gradual decline in price response to reces-
sions over the postwar period." His interpretation is that "an intensifica-
tion of general anticipations of inflation over the postwar period has
lessened the response of manufacturing prices to short-run variations in
demand" (p. 55). Sachs (1980) restates Cagan's interpretation by as-
serting that the new postwar intention to pursue countercyclical stabili-
zation policy shifted expectations toward the belief that recessions would
be temporary and that business firms would feel less need to reduce
prices to sell their goods. Sachs also emphasizes the growing importance
of long-term wage bargaining. By these interpretations the change in the
character of the inflation process evident in the 1952-54 period may be
traced ultimately both to the Wagner Act of 1935 and the Employment
Act of 1946.
The relation between inflation and nominal GNP growth displayed in
figure 2.1b has another interpretation. This alternative viewpoint would
state that nothing special happened to the inflation process in 1952-54;
rather the earlier development of price inertia is disguised by the special
events that dominated price behavior in the early postwar era. The im-
mediate postwar disequilibrium between nominal money and the con-
trolled price level led to a temporary surge of inflation after the termi-
nation of controls in 1946. And the outbreak of the Korean War in
mid-1950 led to a speculative surge in raw materials prices that coin-
cided with a wave of anticipatory buying, creating a short-lived coinci-
dence between nominal GNP growth and price change. The stability
exhibited by the inflation rate after 1952 reflected the termination of
these special factors and the influence of Korean War price controls
rather than any sudden change in underlying behavior. While this ac-
count is plausible, and reminds us that any discussion of price move-
ments during 1946-52 must take account of special factors, it neverthe-
less cannot explain why price behavior was so different in the recessions
of 1949 and 1954, and this difference remains the basis for the claim
that price behavior underwent a basic change after 1952.
1
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Nominal GNP changes are divided by definition between changes in
prices and in real GNP. Thus in figure 2.1b the distance between the
upper and lower line represents increases in real GNP. A more revealing
display of real GNP behavior is provided by figure 2.1c. The real GNP
"gap" is the percentage difference between "natural" and actual real
GNP and ranges between a maximum value of 9.2 percent in 1949:4 to
a minimum value of —4.3 percent in 1953:1. When the gap is in nega-
tive territory the economy is utilizing its resources more intensively than
is compatible with the avoidance of accelerating inflation, while a posi-
tive gap tends to occur during recessions. Figure 2.1c also displays the
relationship of the actual unemployment rate to the "natural" rate of
unemployment. Since a zero output gap is defined by the same criterion
as the natural rate of unemployment, we find that the actual unemploy-
ment rate rises above the natural rate of unemployment in roughly the
same quarters as the output gap rises above zero. The close relation
between the output gap and the difference between the actual and natural
unemployment rates has long been christened "Okun's Law," and ironi-
cally the "law" seems to work better after the publication date of Okun's
original article (1962) than before.
A comparison of figures 2.1b and 2.1c suggests three outstanding
puzzles about aggregate supply behavior in the first postwar decade.
First, why was the output gap so high in 1947-48 when unemployment
was so low? Second, why was there no acceleration of inflation in 1952-
53 in light of the low levels of unemployment and the negative output
gap? Third, why was unemployment so much more stable than the out-
put gap in 1955-57?
The first puzzle about the low level of output in 1947-48 can be re-
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1948:2 and 1951:1, but real GNP was 15.7 percent higher in the later
quarter. The compound annual growth rate between the two quarters
was 5.4 percent, much faster than anyone's estimate of the long-term
growth rate of the economy's "natural" or "potential" real GNP. Be-
cause of the absence of any reason why long-term economic growth
should have been so much faster between 1948 and 1951 than either
before or after, the natural output series used to compute the GNP gap
is based on a linear interpolation between 1929 and 1950, accounting
for the peculiarity in figure 2.1c that the output gap was large in 1947-
48 despite the low level of actual unemployment.
2
0 Given the fact that
the 1948-51 increase in manufacturing real output was 20 percent and
in the government sector was 30 percent, I conjecture that a great deal
of private and government capital constructed during World War II was
temporarily underutilized in 1947-48, due to the low level of defense
spending, and that labor was temporarily absorbed in low-productivity
service occupations.
The second supply puzzle centers on the low level of inflation in
1952-53 when the unemployment rate was only 3 percent, in contrast
to the acceleration of inflation in 1955-57 when unemployment was 4
percent. The only available explanation is that wage and price controls
during the Korean War must have been quite effective. While Schultze
(1959) proposed an explanation of the acceleration of inflation between
1955 and 1957 based on structural imbalances in the economy, subse-
quent econometric work finds little in the 1955-57 experience that can-
not be explained within a Phillips curve framework.
2
1 The third puzzle,
the failure of unemployment to increase between late 1955 and mid-1957
when the output gap was rising, can be explained by a consistent ten-




2.3.3 A Retrospective View of Stabilization Policy
Herbert Stein (1969) has labeled the postdepression commitment to
fiscal stabilization policy as the "fiscal revolution in America." Yet in
the broadest sense fiscal policy has been the most important destabiliz-
ing influence in the postwar economy. In the first postwar decade the
enormous magnitude of the rise and subsequent fall in defense expendi-
tures was the dominant feature of aggregate demand fluctuations, and
the expansion of spending for the Vietnam War in 1965-68 destabilized
the economy again. By a narrower criterion that takes defense spending
as exogenous and outside the purview of discretionary stabilization pol-
icy, however, fiscal policy deserves relatively high marks in the 1947-57
decade. Several actions were taken that helped to reduce the variance
of income growth, and there were no actions that worked in the oppo-
site direction.122 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/ Herbert Stein
The most important stabilizing action was the rapid move to raise tax
rates immediately after the outbreak of war in mid-1950. The natural-
employment federal surplus (NES) reached 6 percent of GNP during
the last half of 1950, and this helped to dampen the surge of anticipa-
tory buying and accounted for part of the reduction of consumer durable
spending that occurred in 1951. After 1950 the NES was allowed to
slide from +6 percent of GNP to —3 percent by early 1953, a fiscal
stimulus that might have been extremely inflationary were it not for the
influence of price controls.
2
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Two other stabilizing actions were taken, but in each case the cyclical
timing was fortuitous rather than deliberate. Only six months before the
1948 business-cycle peak, Congress passed a large tax reduction over
President Truman's veto, but there is no evidence that the proponents
of the tax cut foresaw the downturn. Then in 1954 there was a cut in
income and excise taxes, but this represented the expiration of wartime-
related taxes rather than an activist initiative designed for stabilization
purposes. If there was a "fiscal revolution" in the first postwar decade,
it was in the willingness to allow the government budget to move into
deficit during recessions, thus allowing the automatic stabilizers to work,
in contrast to the destructive tax increases engineered by Herbert Hoo-
ver in 1932 under the budget-balancing rulebook of pre-Keynesian fiscal
policy.
Most discussions of monetary policy in the first postwar decade center
on the contrast between the Federal Reserve's pre-Accord-pegging policy
and its post-Accord shift to a countercyclical stabilization policy. We
have already noted the relative stability of the growth rate of M2 in
figure 2.1a during the post-Accord 1951-55 period, in contrast to the
destabilizing drop in monetary growth during late 1948 and early 1949
as the Fed "accommodated" the economy's decline. The timing of mone-
tary growth between 1953 and 1957 cannot be faulted, with a stabilizing
boost in monetary growth in 1954 and decline in 1955-56. Perhaps the
main flaw in monetary policy was the acceleration in monetary growth
in late 1951 and 1952, which may have partially accounted for the in-
tensity of the last stage of the business cycle expansion in early 1953.
Another view of monetary policy is presented in figure 2.Id, which
compares the detrended level of the real money supply (M2) with the
ratio of actual to natural real GNP (the latter is equal to unity minus
the GNP "gap"). To achieve economic stabilization the detrended real
money supply should drop when the economy is expanding and should
rise during recessions, and so we would hope to find a negative relation
between the two series in figure 2.Id. Despite the pegging of interest
rates in the pre-Accord period, we see that the negative relation was
quite strong throughout the first postwar decade, with real money being
allowed to drop substantially during the 1947-48, 1950-51, and 1955-123 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
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57 expansions. The expansion in real money in 1949 and 1954 also
operated in a stabilizing direction. Once again, the major flaw in the
timing of monetary policy was the 1951-53 expansion in real balances.
In retrospect the record of stabilization policy in the first postwar
decade, while not perfect, stands out as the best of the four postwar
subperiods. The prompt increase in tax rates in 1950 to finance Korean
War expenditures contrasts with the failure to take decisive action to
reduce the government deficit in 1966. With the exception of the overall
destabilizing role of government military expenditures, the basic effect
of fiscal and monetary actions was to stabilize the economy. Hindsight
allows some quibbling with the behavior of the monetary authorities, but
these actions did not have long-run adverse consequences for economic
performance as did the mistakes of subsequent postwar subperiods.
2.4 The Second Postwar Decade, 1957-67
2.4.1 The Conceptual Framework
There was no quantum change in the consensus paradigm of aggre-
gate demand behavior in the first two postwar decades. Rather there was
a gradual but continuous shift in opinion toward an increased role for
money and monetary policy, marked by mileposts including the Patman
Committee Inquiry, the report and study papers prepared for the Com-
mission on Money and Credit, the negative reaction of many economists
to the downgrading of money in the Radcliffe Report, and the influence
of the monetary research of Milton Friedman, his students, and others.
2
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As in the case of any body of opinion about the operations of the "real
world," the growing belief in the importance of money can be traced to124 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
several episodes in the first postwar decade. Those who believed that
the large outstanding stock of public debt prevented effective monetary
action and required the pegging of interest rates either lost credibility
or changed their opinions when the higher interest rates that followed
the 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord failed to have any disastrous
consequences for debt management of the economy's performance in
general.
2
5 The relative mildness of the 1954 recession was due partly
to countercyclical monetary policy and helped to lessen the belief that
monetary policy was only effective in countering inflation and suffered
from an asymmetric impotence in dealing with slack demand. The con-
tinued acceleration of inflation despite rising interest rates in 1956-57
tempered the belief that monetary policy had unique curative powers to
combat inflation. By 1962 Harry Johnson was able to observe that "the
wheel has come full circle, and prevailing opinion has returned to the
characteristic 1920s view that monetary policy is probably more effec-
tive in checking deflation than in checking inflation."
In contrast to the steady process of change in the consensus analysis
of aggregate demand, the supply-side framework was completely dom-
inated by the influence of the Phillips (1958) article on the historical
United Kingdom relation of wage change and unemployment, together
with the Samuelson-Solow (1960) popularization of the "Phillips curve"
relation between inflation and unemployment for the American audience.
In retrospect the instant success of the Phillips curve framework reflects
the inability of the previous "knife-edge" inflationary gap analysis to
explain, without resort to ad hoc stories about "cost-push," why inflation
accelerated in 1956-57 without excessive overall demand pressure or
why it continued at a significant rate during the 1957-58 recession. For
the first time since the 1946 Employment Act, economists came gener-
ally to recognize that two of the goals of the act, full employment and
price stability, might not be compatible. Only if by happy coincidence
the negatively sloping Phillips curve crossed the zero-inflation point at
an unemployment rate generally regarded as "full" would no policy
problem arise. If, however, full employment and price stability were not
compatible, policymakers would be forced to choose among a set of
second-best points along the Phillips curve. The history of economic
policy between 1957 and 1967 can be summarized in the choice during
1957-60 by Republican policymakers of a point relatively far to the
southeast along the curve, and the rejection of that point by Democratic
policymakers after 1961 in favor of a stimulative "new economics" de-
signed to reach a point further to the northwest.
Another area of change in aggregate supply analysis was the increased
attention to growth in output and productivity, and the interrelations
between growth, investment, and economic policy. Although little atten-
tion was paid to the rapid rates of economic growth being achieved in125 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
most European countries, there was great concern—especially after the
launching of Sputnik in late 1957—over the rapid growth rate achieved
by the Soviet economy and the possibility that the Soviet Union might
overtake the United States as an economic power. This new attention to
growth as a policy problem brought the theoretical models of Tobin
(1955) and Solow (1956) and the empirical work of Solow (1957)
and Denison (1962) quickly into the mainstream of the economics cur-
riculum, and the interest in growth went so far that in 1964 James Tobin
could write, "in recent years economic growth has come to occupy an
exalted position in the hierarchy of goals of government policy" (1964,
p. 1).
2.4.2 Major Surprises of the Second Postwar Decade
Demand Fluctuations
In contrast to the first postwar decade when nominal GNP fluctuations
were extremely large in relation to fluctuations in monetary growth, and
were explained in an arithmetic sense by contemporaneous movements
in velocity, in the second postwar decade money (M2) and nominal
GNP exhibited a much tighter relation, as is illustrated in figure 2.2a.
Beginning in the 1960s the velocity of M2 (that is, nominal GNP di-
vided by M2) displayed a remarkable constancy that lasted until 1977.
2
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Another important feature of figure 2.2a is the tendency of money to
exhibit a significant lead in advance of turning points in nominal GNP.
During the 1958 recovery, 1959 decline, 1961 recovery, 1966 setback,
and 1967 expansion, M2 displayed a consistent lead of about two quar-
ters, suggesting that money was no longer a sideshow in explaining fluc-
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The change in the relation between money and nominal GNP after
1957, which is surely the most surprising aggregate demand event of the
second decade by any ex ante criterion, has been little discussed in the
literature. Although at first glance the main difference between figures
2.1a and 2.2a might appear to be the decline in trend velocity growth
after 1957, in fact the deviations from trend of nominal GNP and money
are much more closely associated in the latter period than the former.
The timing lead of monetary change before nominal GNP change
illustrated in figure 2.2a is presumably the source of the finding of the
"St. Louis equation," first estimated for this period by Anderson and
Jordan (1968), that monetary change is an independent cause of nom-
inal GNP change. The alternative explanation for the close relation
between money and spending is that the Federal Reserve "accommo-
dated" autonomous changes in spending as it attempted to maintain a
stable interest rate. This second explanation emphasizes the "reverse
feedback mechanism" from spending to money that has played a major
role in debates regarding the causes of the Great Contraction of 1929-
33 (Temin 1976). The timing relationships seem to support a money-
to-GNP chain of causation during most of the 1957-67 decade, and a
search for independent actions by the Federal Reserve leads to the
conclusion that the Fed deliberately tightened money and raised interest
rates in 1957, 1959-60, and 1966. But the interpretation of the 1961-
66 expansion is more ambiguous.
The standard interpretation of Federal Reserve actions in the early
1960s concentrates on interest rates rather than monetary aggregates as
indicators of the tightness or looseness of monetary policy. Thus the
most popular explanation of the simultaneous acceleration in money and
nominal GNP growth in 1961 is that the Fed passively accommodated
an expansion caused by nonmonetary factors. Yet a closer examination
casts some doubt on this interpretation of passive accommodation. Far
from holding interest rates constant, the Fed allowed the Federal Funds
rate to drop from its late 1959 peak of 4.5 percent to below 2 percent
in mid-1961 by boosting the growth rate of the monetary base. Then
short-term rates were allowed to increase in steps that were compatible
with a steady but gradually accelerating growth rate of money until
early 1966, when a sudden sharp jump in interest rates was accompanied
by an immediate slowdown in monetary growth.
We turn now to table 2.3, which shows the main components of ex-
penditure during the second decade in the same format as table 2.2. The
1958 recession appears to have been almost identical to the 1954 epi-
sode in its overall magnitude, as measured by the peak-to-trough decline
in real GNP. The two episodes were also virtually identical in the mag-
nitude of the decline in real final sales. The most important difference
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ment expenditures rose, whereas in 1954 they had fallen precipitously.
The 1958 decline in real private final sales was much greater than in
1954.
The 1958-59 recovery in the economy was extremely rapid but was
cut short by the steel strike that began in the third quarter of 1959.
While the strike doubtless interfered with the momentum of the recov-
ery, it appears in retrospect that the deflationary impact of monetary and
fiscal policy during this period was so intense that the expansion would
have aborted even without a steel strike.
The most important feature of the 1957-62 period was the sluggish
behavior of investment. Consumer durable expenditures did not reach
the 1955 peak level again until 1962:1. Nonresidential business fixed
investment slumped below its 1957:3 peak until late 1961. In the 1958-
60 expansion only residential investment showed any buoyancy.
The 1958-60 expansion presents fascinating problems for proponents
of alternative theories of income and investment determination. Present
critics who decry the impact of government deficits on investment would
find little solace in the laggard 1960 investment performance in light of
the high ratio of the NES to GNP reached in 1960. The episode seems
to point to a high real interest rate as a major hindrance to investment.
2
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The literature devoted to the 1961-66 business expansion would fill
several libraries. The remarkable inertia displayed by the inflation pro-
cess in the early 1960s allowed virtually all of the faster nominal GNP
growth to be transmitted directly to real GNP. And rapid GNP growth
over a sustained period of five years (through mid-1966) created an
enormous investment boom, as is illustrated in table 2.3. Total real fixed
investment rose by 48 percent between the 1960:4 cyclical trough and
the 1966:1 peak in the growth cycle (achieved when the ratio of actual
to natural real GNP reaches its peak). Both components of real nonresi-
dential investment shared this experience. In their usual fashion both
residential investment and net exports peaked relatively early in the
expansion.
The second postwar decade ended with a period of monetary restric-
tion. A much discussed and publicized increase in interest rates initiated
by the Fed in late 1965 carried the Moody's Aaa rate up from 4.60
percent in November, 1965 (roughly equaling the early 1960 peak) to
a temporary peak of 5.49 percent in September, 1966. M2 growth
slowed modestly, although not nearly by so much as 1959-60, and nom-
inal GNP growth followed with only a one-quarter lag.
In the language that was soon to be adopted, the 1966 housing slump
represented a classic example of "crowding out" caused by an expansion
in government spending during a period of a constant or declining real
money supply. The behavior of real money may be determined in turn
either by nominal money or the price level, and in 1966 both operated129 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
to cause a marked slowdown in real M2 growth in the four quarters
ending in 1967:1. The sum of real government and fixed investment
spending grew only 1.7 percent over this same four-quarter period, with
most of the increase in real government spending canceled out by a drop




Several crucial issues in current macroeconomic debates are depen-
dent on the data displayed in figure 2.2b. Most important, the econo-
metric message that United States inflation fluctuations are dominated
by inertia, and depend little on current policy or nominal GNP move-
ments, stands out clearly in the diagram. The 1957-64 period also
represents the classic example within the Phillips curve context that high
unemployment has only a modest impact on inflation. Despite the fact
that unemployment was above the "natural" rate continuously between
late 1957 and late 1964, nevertheless the inflation rate decelerated only
from 3.3 percent in the four quarters ending in the cyclical peak quarter
of 1957:3 to a minimum of 1.3 percent in 1964:1.
2
9 This small extent
of deceleration plays an important role in the objections of those who
opposed (in 1969, 1974, and 1979) a rapid deceleration in nominal
demand growth to combat inflation. If inertia truly dominates the be-
havior of inflation, then a slowdown in nominal demand growth that is
faster than the maximum possible slowdown in the inflation rate will
lead to a slump in real GNP and a period of high unemployment and
underutilized resources.
The rapidity of the 1961-66 expansion in real GNP can be viewed
from the perspective of figure 2.2c, which compares the behavior of
unemployment with that of the real GNP "gap." From a level of +5.1
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percent in 1961:1, the gap declined to —4.4 percent in 1966:1, imply-
ing that real GNP grew by 9.5 percent relative to its "natural" or trend
level over that five-year interval. At first glance there is nothing in the
juxtaposition of figures 2.2b and 2.2c to contradict the reigning Phillips
curve paradigm of the 1960s, because the acceleration of inflation from
about one percent to roughly 3 percent between 1961 and 1967 would
appear to be compatible with a northwest movement up the stable Phil-
lips curve associated with a decline in unemployment over the same
period from 7 percent to 3.8 percent.
The collapse of the stable Phillips curve after 1967 is sometimes
allowed to obscure the preponderance of data points during 1967 that
supported the policy stance of the administration. Ignoring the lone
voices of Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps to whom few listened
in 1966, a "natural" unemployment rate is a creation of hindsight wis-
dom that should not blind us to the environment faced by policy-
makers.
3
0 While recognizing that the overall unemployment rate had
been allowed in 1966 and 1967 to slip below the longstanding "full
employment goal" of 4.0 percent, there was little in the behavior of
prices in 1967 to invalidate the notion that the full employment target
was attainable on a permanent basis.
Many features of aggregate economic data in the mid-1960s that then
appeared to represent the dawn of a new era now appear to be the
results of a transient overexpansion of the economy. The high levels of
productivity, the profit share, and stock prices reached in 1965-66 were
particularly ephemeral, both because the overall level of capacity utiliza-
tion that had made them possible was unsustainable, and also because
both productivity and profits enjoy temporary bulges when output growth
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2.4.3 A Retrospective View of Stabilization Policy
A judgment on the merit of fiscal policy in the second postwar decade
naturally begins with the evolution of the NES. Between 1956 and 1963
the NES fluctuated between zero and two percent of GNP, with most
quarters recording the higher rather than the lower value. The only
major fluctuation over this interval was a brief drop into negative terri-
tory during 1958, reflecting the remarkable temporary stimulative ex-
pansion of government expenditures.
3
1 The sharp increase in the NES
from —0.5 percent to +2.5 percent of GNP between late 1958 and
early 1960 later led to the accusation by Walter Heller (1966) and
others that tight fiscal policy had caused the business expansion to abort
prematurely through the "drag" of overly high progressive tax rates.
One man's "fiscal drag" is another man's policy to stimulate invest-
ment by maintaining the federal budget in surplus. The budget-balanc-
ing emphasis of the Eisenhower administration was at least partly based
on the desire to encourage business investment and long-term economic
growth.
3
2 There is no necessity for a high natural employment surplus
to exert a "drag" on the economy if it is combined with an appropriate
monetary policy designed to maintain the economy at its "natural" level
of resource utilization. This possibility of tight fiscal and easy monetary
policy could have been put into practice in the last two years of the
Eisenhower administration but was not, because of the drastic tightening
of money that occurred in 1959-60. Thus Heller's critique must be re-
interpreted as stating that a high natural employment surplus can be a
drag on the economy if monetary policy fails to provide the necessary
economic stimulus.
The history of fiscal policy during the rest of the second postwar
decade consists of the much heralded strategy of the "new economics"
of cutting the natural employment surplus by a series of tax reductions,
including a major cut in the personal income tax in early 1964, reduc-
tions in both excise and personal income taxes in 1965, and new tax
incentives for investment introduced in 1962. Between mid-1963 and
late 1965 the NES fell from +1.5 to —1.0 percent of GNP in response
to the series of tax cuts, and then dropped to —2.2 percent in 1967 as a
result of the failure of the administration and Congress to raise taxes
promptly to pay for Vietnam expenditures.
There are two available interpretations of the relative roles of mone-
tary and fiscal policy in achieving the vigorous economic expansion of
1961-66, depending on one's view of monetary behavior in 1961-66 as
active or passive. The juxtaposition of nominal GNP and monetary
growth rates in figure 2.2a could be interpreted as suggesting that the
expansion was basically a monetary phenomenon, with the impact of
fiscal stimulus evident only in the temporary surge of velocity growth
that occurred in late 1965 and 1966. Yet the proponents of fiscal ac-132 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
tivism would claim that the growth of the money supply was a passive
variable that depended on the vigor of the economic expansion. Thus
expansionary fiscal policy had its main impact not solely through its
direct stimulative effect on spending but also indirectly by allowing the
administration to gain control of the money supply and foster a more
vigorous monetary expansion after 1962.
While it is doubtless true that fiscal policy forced the Federal Reserve
to accelerate monetary growth, nevertheless the distinction between the
direct and indirect multiplier effects of fiscal policy was not sufficiently
appreciated in the mid 1960s. Policymakers took literally Arthur Okun's
(1968) finding that the multiplier for the 1964 tax cut had been a very
large 2.8, not realizing that this figure encompassed not only the direct
impact of the tax cut but the indirect effect accomplished by accommo-
dative passive response of the money supply. This misunderstanding had
unfortunate consequences in 1968, when the Fed failed to play the ac-
commodative role in supporting tighter fiscal policy upon which the
Okun multiplier estimate depended.
3
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The comparison in figure 2.2d between the real money supply and
the output ratio provides a simple measure of the stabilizing or destabi-
lizing role of monetary policy. But in the second postwar decade mone-
tary policy deserves failing marks, particularly for the extent of the
decline in real balances in 1959-60 even after the economy slumped
into recession, for the sluggish growth of real balances in 1960-63 de-
spite the low level of the output ratio, and most notably for the irrespon-
sible expansion of real balances between 1965 and 1968 after real GNP
had exceeded its "natural" level.
Throughout the first two decades most discussions of macroeconomic
issues assumed tacitly that the United States was a closed economy.
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There were two main sets of influence exerted by the external world on
the United States economy. First was the destabilizing effect of two
temporary export booms in 1947 and 1956-57 that helped determine
the timing and also added to the intensity of the 1949 and 1958 reces-
sions. Second was the shift in 1958 from a long period of dollar shortage
to one of dollar surplus, with a continuous loss of official United States
reserves over most of the decade after 1958. Because the United States
current account was in surplus in every year between 1954 and 1969
with the single exception of 1959, there was general agreement that the
balance-of-payments "problem" arose from capital outflows, and that
the only solution to the problem was the maintenance of high short-
term interest rates. To prevent the balance-of-payments policy objective
from interfering with the goal of achieving long-term economic growth,
the Kennedy administration fostered the Operation Twist policy of using
debt management simultaneously to boost short-term rates while lower-
ing long-term rates.
Subsequent research suggested that Operation Twist had not achieved
its objective, and the raw numbers support this conclusion, as for in-
stance the fact that three-month Treasury bill rates were the same in
1956 and 1962 while the Moody's corporate Aaa rate in the latter year
was almost a full percentage point higher (not lower as intended). And,
in an important reinterpretation of the United States international situa-
tion, Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant (1966) concluded that there
had been no problem at all. Rather, the United States for many years
had been operating as a giant financial intermediary, simultaneously
borrowing from foreign governments in a form that created an official
balance-of-payments deficit while lending back to foreign nations by
buying up long-term foreign assets. The United States came out ahead
in this set of transactions when it could earn a higher rate of return on
its foreign assets than it paid out in interest on its reserves.
2.5 The Third Postwar Subperiod, 1967-73
2.5.1 The Conceptual Framework
At its zenith in early 1966, an activist view of fiscal policy appeared
to have achieved an unassailable victory over its critics. Few in the pro-
fession disagreed with Walter Heller's proclamation that "we now take
for granted that the government must step in to provide the essential
stability at high levels of employment and growth that the market mecha-
nism, left alone, cannot deliver" (1966, p. 9). Since the use of changes
in government expenditures for stabilization purposes interfered with
allocative considerations, frequent changes in income tax rates became
the central policy tool. While the consensus policy paradigm did not134 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun Herbert Stein
neglect monetary policy or deny that monetary tightness could interfere
with the pace of economic expansion, monetary policy was basically
kept in the background and relegated to a role of maintaining a low and
stable level of long-term interest rates to foster the goal of stimulating
long-term economic growth. The Democratic advisers in the Kennedy-
Johnson administrations had argued that a substantial reduction in the
unemployment rate could be achieved at the cost of only a moderate
acceleration of inflation, and with an inflation rate of only 3.0 percent
in the four quarters ending in 1967:4 their gamble appeared to have
paid off.
This policy framework collapsed with amazing speed after 1967 as the
result of the interaction of events and economic writings. My graduate
school classmates and I were acutely aware of the timing of this turn in
the intellectual tide, as we began our first teaching jobs in the fall of
1967 and almost immediately found our graduate school education in-
capable of explaining the evolution of the economy. The most important
ingredient in this intellectual revolution was the influence of the Fried-
man-Phelps "natural rate hypothesis" (NRH), which denied the ability
of policymakers arbitrarily to select any inflation-unemployment com-
bination along a stable tradeoff curve.
3
4 Instead, below a critical "natu-
ral" rate of unemployment the inflation rate would continuously acceler-
ate, adding new urgency to Brainard's contemporaneous warning (1967)
that policymakers could not know precisely the multiplier impact of their
actions and had to take care to avoid overshooting the target level of
real GNP.
Soon after the Friedman-Phelps demonstration that the full employ-
ment target of the policy activists might be unsustainable, Andersen and
Jordan (1968) struck another blow with empirical equations that im-
plied that fiscal policy had no impact at all on nominal spending over as
short a period as a year. Although activist advocates eventually re-
grouped and presented convincing evidence of fatal statistical flaws in
the St. Louis procedure (e.g., Goldfeld and Blinder 1972), their disarray
lasted long enough partially to discredit fiscal activism. To add to the
overall indictment of fiscal policy provided by the St. Louis equation,
Robert Eisner (1969) made an important attack on the efficacy of the
temporary tax changes favored by mid-1960s policy activists. Using the
framework of Friedman's permanent income hypothesis of consumption,
Eisner argued that a temporary income tax cut or surcharge would fail
to alter permanent income and thus would have a low spending multi-
plier. Further, the lag in the effect of fiscal policy might be long and/or
unpredictable, with the length of the lag depending on the public's sub-
jective assessment of the likelihood that the tax change soon would be
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These academic criticisms of the activist case might not have been so
persuasive if they had not been accompanied by supporting events. Infla-
tion accelerated between 1967 and 1969 far beyond the expectations of
activist proponents. Further, inflation failed to slow down in the reces-
sion of 1970 and early 1971, as would have been expected along a fixed
Phillips curve. The dramatic drop in the personal saving rate in late
1968 and the failure of spending growth to slow appreciably in response
to the temporary tax surcharge was consistent both with the St. Louis
claim that monetary multipliers had previously been underestimated and
fiscal multipliers overestimated, as well as with the Eisner critique.
The continued economic expansion of 1968, even in the last half of
the year after the tax surcharge had been introduced, also helped to lead
to the de-emphasis of the interest rate as a monetary instrument and to
the increased emphasis on monetary aggregates. Once again, it was an
economic event that helped popularize an economic idea, in this case
Irving Fisher's (1930) distinction between nominal and real interest
rates, revived by Mundell (1963) and Friedman (1968). Conventional
econometric models, even the newly devised MIT-FRB model with its
carefully constructed monetary sector, had neglected the fact that while
the demand for money should depend on the nominal interest rate, the
demand for investment goods should depend on the real interest rate.
The models thus were unable to explain why investment did not slump
in 1968 in response to an increase in the Moody's Aaa rate from the 5.1




2.5.2 Major Surprises of the 1967-73 Period
Demand Fluctuations
The relation between money and nominal GNP growth during the
1967-73 interval shared the main features of the 1957-67 decade. A
sharp deceleration in the monetary growth rate beginning in early 1969
was followed with about a two-quarter lag by a marked (but less sharp)
deceleration in nominal GNP growth. The 1969-70 episode in figure
2.3a seems to repeat the basic pattern of 1959-60, with the minor decel-
eration of 1966-67 significantly less severe in intensity. The recoveries
in monetary growth in 1967-68 and in 1971-72 were also followed
with a short lag by recoveries in nominal GNP growth. The major irreg-
ularity concerns the period between 1971 and 1973, when two years
lapsed between the peak growth of M2 in mid-1971 and the peak growth
in nominal GNP in early 1973. The overall trend growth in M2 and
nominal GNP was about the same over the period, reflecting the con-136 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
stancy in the velocity of M2 exhibited by the data for the entire period
between 1960 and 1977.
Table 2.4 exhibits the main components of real GNP in the same
format as for the first two postwar decades. After early 1967 the econ-
omy resumed a rapid expansion, with growth in real final sales of about
7.5 percent in the six quarters ending 1968:3. During this interval the
growth in federal spending decelerated, and the expansion was fueled
by a rapid increase in consumer investment (durables plus housing), an
increase that can be explained mainly as a result of the vigorous growth
in monetary aggregates over the same period.
The most important issue concerning the behavior of aggregate de-
mand during the 1967-73 period concerns the temporary income tax
surcharge that was introduced in July 1968, and since has come to rep-
resent the Waterloo of activist fiscal stabilization management. While
the charge that the surcharge failed to dampen consumer spending has
been debated in a series of econometric articles, the following crude
facts of the episode given for the first and last halves of 1968 are sugges-
tive (all dollar amounts are in current prices).
First Half Last Half
Dollars Percentage Dollars Percentage








































The most important finding in this table is that a drop in the share of
personal saving in personal income exactly offsets the increase in the
share of tax payments. There was no change at all in consumer spending
out of personal income, although the share of consumer spending in per-
sonal disposable income increased from 90.3 to 91.9 percent. A more
complete verdict on the episode requires a model to predict what would
have been expected to happen to consumer spending, given the behavior
of income, wealth, and other variables. The latest conclusion by Blinder
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Fig. 2.3a
estimated to have only about 20-60 percent of the impact of permanent
taxes of the same magnitude, and rebates are estimated to have only
about 10-50 percent of the impact." Both the facts in the table and
Blinder's evaluation would appear to support Eisner's initial point that
the effects on consumption of temporary tax changes are likely to be
weak, uncertain, or both.
After the peak of the growth cycle was reached in 1968:3, the econ-
omy moved sideways for the next year. Defense spending had peaked
in the summer of 1968, and the modest drop in federal spending over
that year was roughly canceled out by a further increase in investment.
A surprising feature of the evolution of spending during 1969 and 1970
was the more moderate extent of the decline in housing expenditure than
occurred in 1966-67 despite the drastic extent of "disintermediation"
that drained money from commercial bank time deposits and from sav-
ings institutions. Government spending expanded rapidly in 1966-67 and
slumped continuously between mid-1968 and mid-1971, thus "crowding
out" housing in the earlier period and "crowding in" housing in the later
period.
The mildness of the 1970 recession is evident in table 2.4, with a
peak-to-trough decline in real final sales of only $1.9 billion, all of
which can be accounted for by the General Motors strike of 1970.
3
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In fact the behavior of the economy in 1970 is better described as a
"hiatus" than as a recession, and is more than accounted for by the drop
in federal defense spending. In the league table of postwar recessions
measured by the change in real final sales between the NBER peak-and-
trough quarters, 1970 on a strike-adjusted basis was more severe than
1949 or 1960, but less severe than 1954, 1958, or 1975. The automatic
stabilizers worked with a vengeance: real personal income in the trough139 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
quarter was up 2.2 percent over the peak quarter; real personal dis-
posable income was up even more due to the partial expiration of the
tax surcharge.
The subsequent expansion was relatively sluggish in real terms
throughout 1971 but then exploded at a frenetic pace through the
growth-cycle peak in 1973:1. By far the most remarkable aspect of the
expansion was the behavior of real consumer investment, including both
consumer durable expenditures and residential investment, which leaped
at an enormous annual rate of 16.8 percent between the trough and
growth-cycle peak (adjusted for the 1970 auto strike). Juxtaposing this
record with the behavior of monetary growth in figure 2.3a, it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that the boom of 1972-73 was primarily due to the
influence of the acceleration of monetary growth in 1971, although some
credit is due to consumer optimism engendered by the price control
program of 1971-72.
By all standards (except the long-run implications of excess demand)
1973:1 was a vintage quarter for the American economy. The ratio of
actual to natural output reached almost as high a level as the previous
peaks achieved in 1966:1 and 1968:3. Consumer and business invest-
ment reached the highest all-time level of the postwar era when ex-
pressed as a ratio to natural real GNP. The record achieved in 1973:1
exceeds that of other peak quarters which have been highlighted in this
paper.
3
7 The following figures show the ratio of real consumer and busi-
ness investment (excluding net exports and inventory accumulation) to

















Several other interesting features of the spending components are evi-
dent in table 2.4. After two decades of roughly 6 percent growth in real
terms, state and local real spending increased at only 4 percent during
1967-73, and 2.3 percent between early 1973 and late 1978, leading
one to ask why the Proposition 13 revolt against excessive spending did
not occur earlier. Net exports were much lower during 1968-70 than at
any previous time during the postwar period, reflecting the overvaluation
of the dollar that culminated in the dollar crisis and Smithsonian Agree-
ment of 1971. The fact that net exports were higher in the peak quarter
1973:1 than in the trough quarter 1970:4 suggests that the intervening140 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
devaluations of the dollar had begun to stimulate the United States trade
balance.
After early 1973 the economy faltered. A boom in net exports did not
succeed in offsetting the continued decline in federal spending and a re-
duction in consumer investment, so that real final sales were lower in
1973:4 than in 1973:1. The NBER cyclical peak is set in late rather
than early 1973 only because of a massive accumulation of inventories
that temporarily maintained real GNP, threw the economy's inventory-
sales ratio out of equilibrium, and partially explains the severity of the
recession during the winter of 1975.
Supply Phenomena
The collapse of the policy paradigm that relied on a fixed Phillips
curve occurred in three stages during the period between 1968 and 1971.
First, the economy's 1968 recovery from the 1967 slowdown carried in-
flation up to the 4.5 percent region, in contrast to the inflation rates of
3.2-3.5 percent that had been experienced in 1966 at roughly the same
rates of unemployment and resource utilization. This outcome led to
general recognition that lags in the inflation process might have been
ignored, that the position of the Phillips curve might be sensitive to ex-
pectations of inflation, and that there was a long-run Phillips curve with
a steeper slope than the short-run schedule. Nevertheless, as long as the
steeper long-run curve had a negative rather than vertical slope, there
was still a policy tradeoff to be exploited by the policymakers.
The second stage of the collapse occurred during the recession of
1969-70. In contrast to the drop in inflation recorded in each preceding
postwar recession and in the growth slowdown in 1967, there was no
noticeable decline in inflation during 1970. The change in the GNP de-
flator over the four quarters ending in 1970:4 (the trough quarter) was
5.0 percent, little different than the 5.2 percent rate recorded during the
four quarters of 1969.
Finally, the last stage in the collapse occurred during the first two
quarters of the 1971 economic recovery. Despite a sluggish rate of real
GNP growth that failed to bring unemployment down from its 6.0 per-
cent peak rate, inflation still refused to abate, and in fact accelerated to
a 5.9 percent annual rate. Wage growth accelerated as well, leaving little
hope that policymakers could rely merely on high unemployment to
achieve any significant deceleration in the inflation process. The early
1971 experience was soon reflected in the verdict of econometric studies
that there was no longer any basis for belief that the long-run Phillips
curve was negatively sloped rather than vertical.
3
8 And a more impor-
tant immediate consequence was that the behavior of wages and prices
in the first half of 1971 caused the Nixon administration to give up on141 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
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its policy of "gradualism" and to reverse its previous disavowal of con-
trols by instituting a wage and price freeze on 15 August 1971.
The initial three-month freeze in wages and prices was followed by
several further "phases" of controls with varying rules. A crude verdict
that the program had a temporary impact is provided in figure 2.3b,
which shows that the inflation failed to slow down to any significant
degree in response to the 1969-70 deceleration of nominal GNP growth,
but then dropped substantially in 1972 despite the rapid acceleration of
nominal GNP growth. Another crude verdict can be provided by an
inspection of the annual percentage rates of change over selected inter-





























Some early evaluations of the control program focused on the behavior
of the CPI. Since the CPI had already decelerated very substantially in
the year ending in 1971:2, it was claimed that the controls had no spe-
cial effect and the relatively low inflation rate of late 1971 and 1972142 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
just represented the continuation of a process of deceleration that was
already under way.
3
9 But the picture is very different if we look at an
alternative and generally superior measure, the deflator for personal
consumption expenditures. By this measure there was virtually no slaw-
down in inflation prior to the onset of the controls, and then a sudden
drop by about 1.5 percentage points over the next six quarters when the
influence of food and energy prices is excluded from the deflator.
The subsequent history of consumer prices also leads to differing
evaluations, depending on which index is used. The rules of the control
program were loosened in the transition from Phase II to Phase III at
the beginning of 1973. According to the CPI, the acceleration of infla-
tion in 1973 to rates faster than any experienced in the post-Korean
period indicates that the controls had ceased to have any impact and
that inflation reflected the excessive expansion of aggregate demand. On
the contrary, the "net" personal consumption deflator rose in 1973 and
early 1974 at a rate little different from the 1969-70 experience and sug-
gests that any stimulative impact of demand was canceled out by a
lingering effect of the controls.
Subsequent econometric evaluations tend to conclude that the price
controls did succeed temporarily in holding down the price level by two
to three percentage points during 1972 relative to what would have been
expected to occur in the absence of controls with the same level of re-
source utilization. In 1973 the controls had little impact either way, and
then after the formal abandonment of controls in 1974:2, the entire
earlier effect of controls was dissipated by a rebound in the price level.
There was virtually no impact of the controls on wage inflation (except
perhaps in the construction industry), so that the controls exerted their
effect on inflation only by squeezing profit margins rather than by caus-
ing a deceleration of the entire inflationary process.
Between late 1972 and the spring of 1974 there was a rapid accelera-
tion in the overall inflation rate, more than half of which appears to
have been caused by an acceleration of food and energy prices, and the
remainder by some combination of nominal demand growth and the
loosening of controls. Farm prices almost doubled between early 1972
and the summer of 1973 as the result of the simultaneous occurrence
of several adverse factors, including the delayed impact of the 1971
dollar devaluation, crop failures in many parts of the world combined
with massive sales of United States wheat to the Soviet Union, and a
peculiar disappearance of Peruvian anchovies from their normal feeding
grounds. The reference to this episode as a "supply shock" here and in
other papers does not deny that the worldwide economic boom of 1972-
73 may have had some impact on the relative price of food, but rather
represents the judgment that most of the unprecedented jump in this
relative price stemmed from the upward shift of a supply curve rather143 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
than the movement of a demand curve outward along a fixed supply
curve. The formation of the OPEC cartel and its impact on oil prices in
1973-74 also seems to have been mainly an autonomous supply shift.
The appearance of supply shifts as a source of changes in the inflation
rate, first in the form of price controls and then in the form of an explo-
sion of food and oil prices followed by a postcontrols rebound, was by
far the most important economic event of the 1970s. No longer could
stable aggregate demand growth insure a stable path of real GNP or
unemployment, nor could unstable behavior of real GNP or unemploy-
ment be blamed solely on the policymakers controlling aggregate de-
mand. Policy discussions now had to be framed in terms of the optimal
degree of "accommodation" of supply shifts by policymakers, who had
to be viewed as much less autonomous and powerful in light of the new
constraints they faced.
While most of the story of policy responsiveness to supply shocks
belongs in the history of the post-1973 subperiod, the issue first becomes
relevant during the 1971-73 control interval. Because the temporary
success of the controls allowed the inflation rate to slow while demand
growth was accelerating, a large gap was opened between the growth
rates of nominal GNP and inflation. Real GNP surged ahead, the GNP
gap fell close to its postwar minimum, and unemployment declined as
well, as shown in figure 2.3c. Far from accommodating the controls pro-
gram by decelerating the growth of nominal GNP, monetary policy-
makers allowed the growth of money and nominal GNP to accelerate.
In this sense the output boom was caused both by the effects of controls
in shifting the division of a given rate of nominal GNP growth toward
faster real GNP growth and less price change, and as well by the Federal
Reserve in allowing nominal GNP growth to accelerate.
Percent
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The 1967-73 period witnessed a substantial increase in the estimated
"natural rate of unemployment," the unemployment rate believed to be
compatible with steady inflation. The natural rate concept in this paper,
based on the work of Perloff and Wachter (1979), shifts upward after
1963 as a result of the demographic changes that raised the overall
unemployment rate relative to the rate for "prime-aged" adult males.
For instance the unemployment rate of males aged twenty-five and over
was an identical 3.0 percent in 1955 and 1974, but the aggregate unem-
ployment rate increased between the two years from 4.2 to 5.6 percent.
4
0
To the extent that it is valid to infer that the tightness of the prime-aged
male labor market has a disproportionate impact on wage and price
behavior, this demographic shift helps to explain why the 6.0 percent
unemployment rate experienced during 1970 and 1971 had so little
downward impact on the inflation process.
It was during the 1967-73 period that concern first surfaced about
the behavior of United States productivity growth. Indeed the 1967-73
average growth in output per hour in the private business sector was at
an annual rate of 2.1 percent, down from 3.2 percent in the 1957-67
decade. It now appears, however, that this slowdown mainly reflects
cyclical phenomena. The rapid growth of productivity between 1957 and
1967 can be partly accounted for by the higher level of resource utiliza-
tion in the latter year, and productivity in 1973 appears to have been
held down by a tendency that seems to surface in the last stage of every
business cycle for firms to allow themselves to become overstaffed.
4
1
2.5.3 A Retrospective View of Stabilization Policy
Almost nothing can be said on behalf of stabilization policy in the
1967-73 period. Nominal GNP growth was allowed to become much
too rapid in both 1968 and again in 1972-73. Both of these accelera-
tions of demand growth were preceded by accelerations of the growth
of the money supply that could have been avoided by adherence to a
monetary growth "rule" of the type long advocated by Milton Friedman,
and both periods of monetary acceleration were clearly irresponsible in
light of the overly high level of resource utilization in 1968 and of the
need for a monetary deceleration to accommodate the 1971-72 price
controls. The 1969 monetary slowdown was needed, but its severity
would not have been required if the prior 1968 acceleration had not
occurred.
Throughout this paper we have inspected the relation between the
detrended level of real M2 and the ratio of actual to "natural" output to
form a judgment on the stabilizing or destabilizing role of monetary
policy. Figure 2.3d shows the extremely strong positive relation between
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sion of real balances in 1968 when the output ratio was already too
high, a rapid drop in real balances that brought the output ratio below
unity, and then another expansion that continued after the output ratio
had risen above unity.
The overheated expansion of 1972-73 is perhaps the leading postwar
example of Nordhaus's (1975) "political business cycle" in action. The
temporary success of the controls in holding down the price level in
1971-72 would have generated rapid growth in real GNP even if nom-
inal GNP had been maintained along a constant-growth-rate path. But
the Fed's expansionary monetary policy allowed nominal GNP growth
to accelerate, perhaps in the belief that the controls program had al-
lowed an abandonment of caution and the generation of a full-fledged
preelection boom. The political business cycle model predicts that policy
shifts to restriction immediately after an election, and indeed within
three months the controls program had been partially dismantled and
monetary growth began to decelerate.
Fiscal policy receives demerits during 1967-73 as well. Real federal
government expenditures on goods and services were allowed to drop
continuously between mid-1968 and mid-1973, but the speed of decline
was most rapid between mid-1969 and mid-1970, thus aggravating the
recession, and the decline ceased between mid-1971 and mid-1972, thus
intensifying the expansion in total demand. Tax policy appears super-
ficially to have contributed to stability, since the effective personal in-
come tax rate dropped in 1970 and increased in 1972, but there is no
visible stabilizing impact of these changes because they were completely
offset by opposite movements in the saving ratio. Just as the temporary
tax surcharge had not affected consumption appreciably in 1968, so its146 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
termination in 1970 had no effect, and taxpayers were smart enough to
"pay for" the higher tax collections due to overwithholding in 1972 by
cutting their saving rather than their consumption.
4
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2.6 The Fourth Postwar Subperiod, 1973-79
2.6.1 The Conceptual Framework
The year 1973 represents the high-water mark of monetarism. Almost
every change in the intellectual consensus in the late 1960s had favored
the monetarist position on the issues of both monetary potency and
antiactivism, from the accumulating body of evidence that the major
source of changes in nominal demand had been prior movements in the
money supply, to the demise of the short-run Phillips curve that elim-
inated the scope for any long-run effect of activist policy on the unem-
ployment rate, to the debacle of the 1968 tax surcharge episode.
4
3 It is
fitting that 1973 ended with the publication of Goldfeld's much cited
empirical study that showed the demand for money to be a stable and
predictable function of income and interest rates, thus appearing to
eliminate instability in money demand as a qualification to the case for
a constant-growth-rate rule.
The major effect on economic ideas of the 1973-74 supply shocks
was to undermine the case for a constant-growth monetary rule. The
theoretical analysis of policy responses to supply shocks, developed by
R. J. Gordon (1975a) and Phelps (1978), starts with an appeal to
arithmetic—a common feature of all adverse supply shocks is that the
division of any given level of nominal GNP is shifted toward a higher
price level and a lower level of real GNP.
4
4 An expansive or "accom-
modating" demand policy can moderate the impact on real GNP only
at the cost of raising the price level and aggravating inflation. Restrictive
or "extinguishing" demand policy can moderate the price increase only
at the cost of further aggravating the shortfall of real GNP. The choice
between an accommodative, extinguishing, or neutral demand policy
depends primarily on the nature of wage-setting institutions, on the
openness of the economy, and on the relative welfare costs of inflation
and unemployment.
The initial impact of an adverse supply shock—e.g., an OPEC price
hike—is to raise the share of total spending on the product in question
(energy), if its demand is price inelastic. The automatic consequence
is that a fixed level of nominal GNP will be devoted more to spending
on energy and less to spending on nonenergy goods and services. The
reduced amount of nonenergy spending in nominal terms could be re-
flected in lower real nonenergy output, lower nonenergy prices, or both.147 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
Imagine first that the domestic wage rate is fixed, and nonenergy prices
are "marked up" over that wage rate by a constant fraction. Then all of
the impact of the supply shock will fall on nonenergy real output. Be-
cause the wage rate is unresponsive to aggregate demand, stabilization
policy can boost nominal income and thus real nonenergy output with-
out raising nonenergy prices. Policy cannot prevent the overall price
level (of energy and nonenergy products together) from rising, but it
can prevent the wasteful loss of nonenergy output. The crucial feature
allowing this beneficent impact of stabilization policy is the willingness
of workers to accept a loss in real wages, that is, in the ratio of their
fixed nominal wage to the higher overall price level.
At the opposite extreme, assume that domestic wages are fully and
instantly indexed to the overall price level, and the change in the real
wage depends only on the pressure of real nonenergy demand in the
economy. Then the decline in the real wage required to balance the ad-
verse impact of the supply shock on labor productivity is inhibited by
the indexing formula and can be achieved only if stabilization policy
allows real nonenergy demand to decline. Complete cost-of-living esca-
lation of the wage rate (or de facto real wage rigidity in wage bargain-
ing) thus makes a potentially serious recession and climb in the unem-
ployment rate inevitable in the wake of a supply shock, a feature that
several authors have pointed to as explaining the failure of European
economies to recover after 1975 as rapidly as in the United States. In
such an economy with real-wage rigidity, the economy's short-run aggre-
gate supply schedule is steep, and stimulative aggregate demand policy
will cause extra inflation with little benefit in the form of extra real
output.
One of the most important phenomena in the United States economy
is the inertia displayed by year-to-year changes in the nominal wage
rate, resulting from the institution of long-term overlapping wage con-
tracts with decentralized bargaining. While only part of the economy is
unionized, the three-year contracts set in the unionized sector tend to
set a pattern for important parts of the nonunionized sector. Because
the aggregate nominal wage index depends mainly on its own past
values, and responds only partially to consumer price inflation and real
demand pressure, the aggregate real wage tends to be quite flexible. This
creates a case for partial accommodation of supply shocks within the
United States institutional framework; the degree of additional inflation
caused by such accommodation is modest compared to the real output
gained. A serious qualification to accommodation comes mainly from
the fact that the United States is not a closed economy, and a greater
degree of monetary expansion in the United States than abroad tends to
cause a depreciation of the dollar and add extra inflationary pressure148 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
to the initial impact of the supply shock. Depending on policy responses
in other countries, the United States nevertheless may obtain a real wel-
fare gain by accommodation.
During the 1973-79 decade the analysis of supply shocks consumed
relatively little space in academic journals compared to the implications
for economic policy of the "rational expectations hypothesis" that firms
and households base their decisions on all available information includ-
ing the past behavior of policymakers. When combined by Sargent and
Wallace (1975) with the "Lucas supply hypothesis" (Lucas 1973) that
explains output changes by current and prior unexpected changes in
prices, the idea of rational expectations led to a theorem that nominal
demand policy is impotent to affect real output by any kind of system-
atic policy that responds regularly to past values of economic variables.
Although it caused much ferment in academic circles and many heated
conference exchanges, the Sargent-Wallace theorem had little impact
on policymakers, because its underlying supply hypothesis depended on
instantaneous price flexibility and thus seemed more applicable to price-
taking yeoman farmers than to the price-setting institutions of the post-
war United States. Since 1954 United States price changes have been
dominated by inertia, and it is hard to explain the volatile movements




Another aspect of post-1973 economic performance that influenced
prevailing opinion was the inability of earlier studies of the demand for
money to explain the evolution of monetary aggregates. These unex-
plained movements in velocity that Goldfeld soon labeled "The Case of
the Missing Money" eroded part of the intellectual underpinning of the
case for a contant-growth-rate monetarist rule. As Poole (1970) had
shown, instability in the demand for money provides a justification for
using interest rates as well as a monetary aggregate as instruments of
monetary policy.
2.6.2 Major Surprises of the 1973-79 Period
Demand Fluctuations
The relation between the four-quarter changes in nominal GNP and
money displayed in figure 2.4a are not nearly as close as during 1960-
73. Not only did the trend velocity of M2 begin again to grow after a
long period of constancy, but the timing of growth peaks in nominal
GNP was quite different from that of peaks in money. Between early
1976 and early 1979 M2 growth was fastest in just the period when
nominal GNP growth was slowest, i.e., between late 1976 and mid-1977.
On the basis of the widespread prediction in early 1976 that the velocity
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admirably in keeping the four-quarter change of M2 growth between
early 1976 and early 1979 within the relatively narrow range of 8.5
percent to 10.5 percent. Nevertheless this record of monetary stability
did not prevent nominal GNP growth from accelerating to a four-quar-
ter change ending in 1979:1 of 13.3 percent, faster than any similar
change recorded during the previous twenty-seven years.
A comparison with similar figures for the earlier postwar subperiods
suggests that both nominal GNP and monetary growth were more stable
during 1973-79 than before. There were no sharp decelerations in mon-
etary growth as had occurred in 1959-60 or 1969-70. In fact the mod-
est 1975 slowdown in the growth rate of M2 was less marked than the
1948 and 1966 episodes. The fact that nominal GNP growth slowed
down so much more than monetary growth, and rebounded more at the
end of the recession, resembles the pro-cyclical fluctuations in velocity
that occurred in the 1950s and probably results from the extent of the
inventory correction that was required in 1974-75. In any case, nothing
in the nominal figures plotted in figure 2.4a would indicate to an unin-
formed reader that the 1974—75 recession was the most serious of the
postwar era. The real story of that recession is of instability of prices in
one direction and real GNP in the opposite direction.
The components of real GNP in key quarters during the 1973-79
interval are displayed in table 2.5. The severity of the 1973-75 reces-
sion is evident both in the behavior of real GNP and real final sales.
The final sales decline between the cyclical peak and trough amounted
to 3 percent of GNP, as compared to less than 2 percent in both 1954
and 1958. On top of that the shift from inventory accumulation in the
peak quarter to nonaccumulation in the trough quarter amounted to 3.5
percent of real GNP, again higher than in any previous recession. The150 Robert J. Gordon/ Arthur M. Ok un/Herbert Stein
Table 2.5 Real GNP (1972 Prices) and
during the 1973-79 Interval
A. Natural Real GNP
B. Real GNP
1. Real final sales
2. Inventory change

















































































decline in real final sales was uniformly severe in each component of
consumer and business investment. Because the peak-to-trough growth
in state and local government spending was unusually slow by past his-
torical standards, and because federal spending did not increase, the
only stabilizing component of expenditure was net exports.
The 1975-78 recovery can be contrasted to the recovery between the
1970 cyclical trough and the 1973 growth-cycle peak. In both cases
the recoveries proceeded without any push from federal government
spending and were led by consumer and business investment. The main
differences between the two expansions were in their intensity and dura-
tion; while nominal GNP growth was as rapid during most of the 1975-
78 expansion as during 1972-73, there was no controls program to hold
down inflation, so that more of the recent expansion took the form of
price increases and less the form of real GNP growth. The evolution
of the economy after 1978:4 was very similar to that after 1973:1. In
both cases there was a sideways movement of real GNP that occurred
as a supply-induced acceleration of inflation "used up" the available
growth in nominal GNP. The 1979 situation was healthier than that in
1973, however, because there was no spurt of excessive inventory ac-
cumulation such as occurred in 1973:4. Nevertheless, the economy col-
lapsed in March 1980, eighteen months after the growth-cycle peak,151 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
repeating almost exactly the lag between the 1973:1 growth-cycle peak
and the collapse in October 1974.
Supply Phenomena
The role of supply shocks in determining the behavior of inflation
and real output growth in the 1973-75 recession stands out quite clearly
in figure 2.4b. The four-quarter inflation rate steadily accelerated be-
tween early 1973 and early 1975 and then decelerated even faster. A
rough estimate is that the peak four-quarter inflation rate of almost 12
percent can be broken down as follows: an underlying 5 percent infla-
tion rate, plus the delayed impact of excessive demand growth in 1973
amounting to about 2 percent, plus an effect of energy and food prices
of about 3 percent, plus the effect of the postcontrols rebound of an-
other 2 percent. The precise allocation of these estimates depends on
the particular quarter in question, since the direct impact of higher
energy and food prices reached its peak at the end of 1973 and the
beginning of 1974, while the postcontrols rebound had its greatest effect
in the last half of 1974.
Some commentators argue that the rapid deceleration of inflation after
the recession trough proves that restrictive demand management can be
a very effective anti-inflationary policy within a short period of time.
But this interpretation of the inflation slowdown of 1975-76 flies in the
face of everything else we know about the postwar period, including
the extremely gradual slowdown in inflation during the 1958 and 1960
recessions, the absence of any significant slowdown in 1970-71 prior
to the controls, and the transient nature of several components of the
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rate of change of that relative price will temporarily increase and then
later decrease. Similarly, the postcontrols rebound was temporary by
nature. Thus most of the moderation of inflation in 1975-76 had little
to do with restrictive demand policy, although it does seem clear that




In 1978-79 inflation accelerated once again almost to the level
reached in late 1974 and early 1975. Although the precise details of
timing were different, the basic nature of the 1978-79 episode was sim-
ilar. There was no price controls program to produce a rebound, but
there were increases in relative prices of food and energy once again, as
well as some effect of the increasing utilization of resources during 1968.
But most popular discussions exaggerated both the intensity of the 1979
inflation and the role of excessive demand growth causing it. In 1979:3
the National Income Accounts personal consumption deflator (PCD)
increased at an annual rate of 10 percent, of which fully 3.3 percentage
points were due to the direct effect of the higher relative prices of food
and energy. The net, or energy-and-food-consumption deflator, increased
at a rate of 6.7 percent, only about one percentage point faster than its
1976-77 pace, far less of an acceleration than the misleading eight per-
centage point speedup in inflation as registered by the CPI. Most com-
mentaries on the unprecedented discrepancy between the PCD and CPI
emphasized the flaws of the latter rather than the former. As of the third
quarter of 1979 there had not yet been any decline in real GNP on a
four-quarter change basis as had occurred throughout 1974 and the first
half of 1975, reflecting the fact that nominal GNP growth had been
faster during 1979 and inflation slower than at the same stage of the
1974-75 cycle. The decline in real GNP finally occurred in 1980:2.
The behavior of unemployment and the GNP gap are displayed in
figures 2.4c and d. The duration of the recovery between early 1975 and
late 1978 is similar to that between early 1961 and late 1964. Each pe-
riod finished with the economy arriving at its natural rate of unemploy-
ment and output, with the magnitude of reduction in unemployment and
the GNP gap greater in the 1975-78 recovery because of the deeper
trough of the preceding recession. Then after late 1978 the economy
took a totally different turn that after late 1964. Whereas the slow and
steady expansion in the earlier episode had been followed by a rapid
drop in the GNP gap as Vietnam War spending began, in 1979 the sup-
ply inflation used up most of the available nominal GNP growth and
caused the GNP gap to increase.
The laments of economic policymakers at their inability to stop supply
inflation in 1979 echoed those of 1974. But now in 1979 there was a
new supply-side problem. The pace of productivity expansion had pro-
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with the experience in previous recoveries. By late 1979 it appeared that
the secular growth rate in productivity might be less than one percent,
and a search for the causes of the secular slowdown stimulated a num-
ber of studies that were as interesting as they were inconclusive.
4
7 Be-
cause some foreign nations had not suffered as great a slowdown in
productivity or as great an acceleration in inflation, the unfortunate
supply events of 1978-79 had the healthy effect of forcing chauvinistic
United States economists to pay more attention to the condition of the
outside world. There was no agreement, however, as to whether the poor
United States productivity and inflation performances were related, or
whether there was some deeper social problem in American society.
4
8
2.6.3 A Retrospective View of Stabilization Policy
Different standards must be applied in judging policymakers who are
forced to react to supply shocks and those who live in a relatively peace-
ful world in which demand instability is the only problem. Since a
supply shock in the form of higher prices of food or energy must worsen
either inflation or unemployment, and usually both, policymakers can-
not hope to escape criticism. Recent evaluations of this policy problem
have pointed to the relative rigidity of the United States nominal aggre-
gate wage rate as the central factor allowing an accommodative mone-
tary policy in response to shocks like those faced by the United States
in 1973-74 and 1979. And Gramlich's (1979) calculations show that a
reasonable weighting of the relative welfare costs of unemployment and
inflation makes an accommodative reaction yield a much higher level of
social welfare than does an "extinguishing" reaction that attempts to
beat the inflation out of the system.154 Robert J. Gordon/ Arthur M. Okun Herbert Stein
Even among those who do not agree with the details of these studies
there appears to be little disagreement that policymakers made a serious
mistake in allowing monetary growth to decelerate in 1974-75. The re-
maining question is whether an acceleration should have been allowed
to occur, and if so how much. This debate is unlikely ever to be settled,
because it depends not only on one's ability to trust econometric evalu-
ations of the consequences of alternative policies, but one's guess as to
whether there would have been a wage acceleration in response to more
accommodative policies as occurred in Sweden, Italy, and the United
Kingdom.
4
9 Those who thought that the greater public awareness of
inflation would substantially increase the low degree of "pass through"
of commodity prices into wages must be amazed by the incredible in-
ertia displayed by data on aggregate wage change in 1979 and 1980.
Despite a doubling of the rate of consumer price inflation since 1977
(by the GNP measure), there has been barely one percentage point of
acceleration of wage change.
To add to the humility forced upon United States policymakers by
their vulnerability to supply shocks and the slow rate of secular produc-
tivity growth compared to other nations, the 1978-79 period demon-
strated that United States policy can no longer be made on the basis of
domestic considerations alone. The Federal Reserve no longer has the
latitude to make its decision on the degree of supply-shock accommoda-
tion in isolation, because the pursuit of tighter monetary policies in
Germany and elsewhere may make it impossible for the Fed to accom-
modate without causing a substantial erosion in the value of the dollar.
Not only does a dollar depreciation directly reduce the real income of
United States citizens, but it also tends to have unfortunate political side
effects, especially when it induces OPEC oil ministers to increase the
posted oil price once again. Nevertheless the stimulus of accommodation
to United States real income may still be a wise choice to maximize
United States welfare, especially if OPEC sets oil prices in relation to the
price of a market basket of its imports from all industrialized nations.
While there was no discretionary increase in government spending
on goods and services during the 1974-75 recession, as had occurred
in 1958, nevertheless fiscal policy deserves credit for the size and timing
of the temporary tax rebate and permanent tax reduction introduced in
1975:2. The criticisms leveled at the 1968 tax surcharge apply as well
to the 1975 rebate, although recent studies by Blinder (1978) conclude
that there was a nonnegligible stabilizing effect. One may also argue that
the tax rebate was larger than would otherwise have occurred because
policymakers had absorbed the message of the criticism of the earlier
episode. Finally, it might be argued that a tax rebate may have a greater
effect than a surcharge even if both are equally recognized as temporary,155 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas





because some consumers in a recession may face a liquidity constraint.
The increased attention in macroeconomics to the supply side also
applies to fiscal policy. Analysts have pointed to the "wedge" that taxes
drive between market prices charged by firms and the take-home pay
received by workers. To the extent that after-tax wage increases are
relatively slow to adjust to the pressure of restrictive demand policy,
there may be room for cost-reducing fiscal changes as an anti-inflation
device. For instance, if the social security payroll tax tends to be shifted
forward to prices to a greater extent than the personal income tax, then
a substitution of income-tax for payroll-tax financing of social security
would help to decelerate the inflation rate. The Carter administration's
economic advisers understood this point well but nevertheless allowed
major increases in the payroll tax to take place. This and other cost-
increasing measures, sometimes called "self-inflicted wounds," added to
the upward pressure on food and energy prices on aggregate inflation.
These government-induced supply shocks, including increases in the
minimum wage and in the tightness of regulations, as well as in farm
price supports, have added to the dilemma faced by the Federal Reserve
and increased the chance that the administration will find both inflation
and unemployment at record levels (for an election year) in 1980.
Not only did the government inflict wounds on itself and the economy
in the late 1970s, but it failed to use fiscal policy creatively to reduce
American dependence on imported oil. In Europe and Japan high indi-
rect taxes on energy had long been in effect. These high taxes encour-
aged energy conservation. In addition, OPEC price increases created a
smaller percentage increase in final energy prices—and hence less eco-
nomic disruption—in Europe and Japan than in the low-tax United156 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
States. As early as 1974 American economists had urged adoption of
policies to put heavy taxes on energy and to use the revenue to reduce




In contrast to the interwar period when fiscal policy was faced with
the problem of offsetting both a collapse in private spending and the
destabilizing impact of monetary restriction and bank failures, in the
postwar period external events were the most important single destabil-
izing force, most obviously in the direct impact of Korean and Vietnam
defense expenditures on real GNP and in the effect of the formation of
the OPEC oil cartel in the 1970s on inflation and unemployment. The
record of stabilization policy is mixed. The three most successful epi-
sodes of fiscal stabilization were the prompt increase in taxes to finance
the Korean War in 1950, the countercyclical expansion of government
expenditures in 1958, and the tax rebate and permanent tax reduction
of 1975. Although the 1958 and 1975 episodes had stabilizing effects,
nevertheless they were both too little and too late. The most destabiliz-
ing fiscal episode was the failure to raise taxes to finance the Vietnam
War promptly in 1965-66, leading to deficits and pressure on the Fed-
eral Reserve to expand the money supply excessively in 1967 and 1968.
A major theme of this study has been the changing relation between
changes in nominal GNP and money. Over the middle part of the post-
war era, roughly between 1958 and 1973, accelerations and decelera-
tions in monetary growth regularly preceded movements in nominal
GNP growth of roughly the same magnitude. Monetary policy has not
only been potent but also inept, bearing responsibility for the unneces-
sary recession of 1960, the excessive expansion of nominal GNP growth
in 1967-68, the recession of 1969-70, and the second episode of exces-
sive growth in 1972-73.
The character of business fluctuations differed both before 1958 and
after 1973. In the first postwar decade monetary policy provided a
stable framework for an economy that suffered from business cycles as
a result of unstable government defense expenditures and to a lesser
extent because of autonomous fluctuations in exports. Only during the
pre-Accord period did monetary policy aggravate a business cycle, as
when it allowed monetary growth to decelerate substantially in 1948.
After 1973, demand fluctuations lost their central role as an explanation
of business cycles and took second place to supply shocks. Monetary
authorities made a mistake in slowing monetary growth in response to
the first supply shock episode in 1973-74 but do not bear a major re-
sponsibility for the timing of that recession. In 1979 obsolete operating
rules for monetary policy (abandoned in October 1979) caused overly157 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
slow monetary growth rates in the winter and overly rapid rates in the
summer; a relatively stable performance when measured by four-quarter
changes was not viewed as stable by speculators, so that the Fed found
its freedom of choice regarding the desirable degree of accommodation
of the 1979 supply shock was impeded by its sensitivity to external
events and opinion.
Economic ideas rarely lead economic events but usually follow them.
Although the relation between money and income was quite close after
1958, the monetarist case for policy rules and against discretionary ac-
tivism did not make much progress as an intellectual framework until
the simultaneous coincidence in 1968 of an inflation that accelerated
beyond the predictions of existing models, a tax surcharge that failed in
its announced mission of slowing the economy, and a presidential ad-
dress by the most articulate and influential monetarist thinker. After a
brief hegemony events once again caused a shift in opinion, and the
monetarist tide ebbed under the pressure of supply shocks that added
a new reason to question the optimality of fixed monetary growth rules
and as new "money demand puzzles" were discovered. Not only were
variations in the monetary growth rate incapable of explaining the varia-
tions in the inflation rate during the 1970s, but monetarists were forced
to cede the frontier of creative policy thinking to nonmonetarist schemes
for using taxes and subsidies to counter the impact of the OPEC cartel.
Despite the multitudes of economists who make their living by fore-
casting the future, and despite the brilliance of a small minority among
them, virtually all the "surprises" recorded in this paper have eluded
prediction. The predicted postwar deflation and depression failed to
occur; the flexibly responding price level that dropped in recessions gave
way to the stable Phillips curve tradeoff which in turn gave way to the
natural rate hypothesis; the "new economics" of fiscal activism brought
not permanent high employment but rather transient job gains at the
cost of permanent inflation; an OPEC oil cartel that was initially dis-
missed as about to collapse and irrelevant for macroeconomics actually
ushered in an entirely new way of thinking about economic fluctuations
in which aggregate-demand policymakers are hapless passive agents and
must cede center stage to supply-side policymakers with their redistribu-
tive tax and subsidy schemes; the arrival of flexible exchange rates
brought not a new autonomy for the United States but rather a new
dependence on the opinions of foreign bankers and speculators.
Nevertheless as the 1980s began it was hard to avoid the conclusion
that pessimism had been carried too far. Many United States commen-
tators were so immersed in lamenting American problems that they
neglected to notice a different environment in some other nations. Life
went on in France and Italy with gasoline at three dollars per gallon,
suggesting great potential in the United States for a massive tax on158 Robert J. Gordon/ Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
imported oil to be rebated in the form of subsidies or tax reductions on
nonenergy goods and services. Productivity growth continued, albeit at a
slower rate than before 1973, everywhere but in the United States and
the United Kingdom, suggesting that the solution to the United States
productivity puzzle might begin by dismantling United States policies
that raised costs, discouraged saving, and protected lame-duck industries
and companies. Ironically the United States institution of staggered and
decentralized wage bargaining which in 1970-71 had impeded the gov-
ernment's fight against demand-induced inflation actually proved to be a
blessing in dealing with supply-induced inflation, since sluggish nominal
wage adjustment made the United States real wage more flexible than
that in most other industrialized countries. As the United States entered
the 1980s, a long agenda of positive and forceful economic actions lay
gathering dust, awaiting the new broom of a positive and forceful poli-
tician.
Notes
1. The dichotomy between aggregate demand and supply factors, while useful
for expository purposes, should not blind us to the numerous interactions between
demand and supply factors. For instance, how strong are the forces that tend to
bring about an equality between aggregate demand and supply? What is the opti-
mal demand management policy in response to a supply shock? R. J. Gordon
(1975b) has emphasized the two-way interaction between wage-setting institutions
and monetary policy, while Lucas (1976) has stated the general principle that
private behavior (on both the demand and supply sides) should depend on policy
actions and more generally on the evolution of all economic variables.
2. The loose connection between money and nominal GNP throughout the
1929-41 period is particularly evident in quarterly data, as demonstrated by R. J.
Gordon and Wilcox (1980).
3. The increased role of government has reduced the multiplier effect of autono-
mous changes in spending and thus stabilized the economy. Hickman and Coen
(1976, p. 194) estimate a multiplier for changes in real autonomous spending (for
five years after the change) of 5.09 under the conditions of 1926-40 and only 2.10
under the conditions of 1951-65. R. J. Gordon (1978, p. 494) has calculated that
the automatic fiscal stabilizers absorbed only 5.5 percent of the decline in GNP in
1932, but 36.9 percent in 1975.
4. Many competing labels have been suggested for the state of unemployment
that is compatible with steady inflation. Next to Friedman's "natural rate" label,
the next most frequently used is probably the NAIRU (Non-accelerating-inflation-
rate-of-unemployment) coined by Modigliani and Papademos (1975) and Michael
Wachter (1976).
5. Starting with the 1977 Economic Report of the President the official Council
of Economic Advisers' estimate of potential real GNP has been revised downward
by a large amount. For instance, the estimate of potential real GNP in the 1979
report for 1976 is about $90 billion (or 6 percent) lower than the estimate for the159 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
same year in the 1976 report. See Economic Report of the President (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1979), chart 7, p. 75. This revision
consists partly of a more pessimistic estimate of the long-term growth of labor
productivity and partly a less ambitious 5.1 percent unemployment rate criterion
in contrast to the old 4.0 percent criterion. The figures shown in table 2.1 for
natural real GNP were created by Perloff and Wachter (1979) for 1955-79 and
by R. J. Gordon (1978) for earlier years.
6. This judgment is related to the absence of any other explanation of the re-
markable growth of real GNP between 1948 and 1951.
7. The most accessible discussion of the puzzle is Denison (1979).
8. Modigliani's (1977) presidential address emphasizes the inability of mone-
tary aggregates to explain the instability of the inflation rate in the 1970s.
9. The consequences of supply shocks are studied in Gordon (1975a) and
Phelps (1978).
10. While it does not use the IS-LM apparatus, the discussion of monetary
policy in the second edition of Samuelson's textbook (1951, pp. 372-75) is titled
"The Inadequacies of Monetary Control of the Business Cycle" and states that
"superhuman efforts" are necessary to reduce long-term interest rates and that
"investment is likely to be inelastic with respect to the interest rate." Included in
the discussion (without qualification) is the famous phrase, "You can lead a horse
to water but you can't make him drink" (p. 373).
11. An attempt to provide a statistical estimate of the role of money in the
Great Contraction, quarter by quarter, is provided by R. J. Gordon and Wilcox
(1980).
12. This stability of prices is particularly evident in the monthly CPI figures for
the period between the summers of 1938 and 1940.
13. See Samuelson (1951, pp. 287-88).
14. To Samuelson's credit, he noted this problem (albeit briefly), and wrote:
"Even more ominous is the possibility that prices may begin to shoot up long
before full employment is reached. As a result full employment may never be
reached" (1951, p. 303).
15. Beveridge (1945, p. 200). For a hopeful view that administered contracts
and wage bargaining would make prices relatively inflexible and prevent an infla-
tionary spiral at full employment, see Dunlop (1947), a paper that can be cited
as a precursor of recent attempts by Phelps and Winter (1970) and Okun (1975)
to explain why some wages and prices are administered rather than set in contin-
uously clearing auction markets.
16. See especially Graham (1947).
17. There is no discussion at all in Samuelson (1951) of productivity, economic
growth, or economic development, except for treatments of Malthus, depopulation,
and secular stagnation.
18. The 1955 model change did not just involve a face-lift. Chevrolet and
Plymouth introduced V-8 engines for the first time. The hedonic price literature
identifies a very substantial increase in automobile quality relative to price in 1955.
19. A full exploration of this topic is outside of the scope of this paper. For a
more complete discussion see Sachs (1980) and Gordon (1980).
20. This interpolation procedure is more intricate than is described in the text
and is described in R. J. Gordon (1978, app. C).
21. A unique feature of inflation in 1956-57 is that the acceleration in wages
occurred before that in consumer prices. This timing pattern can be explained by
wage-price models in which the effective minimum wage is a determinant of wage
change, since the largest postwar increase in minimum wage occurred in 1956:1.160 Robert J. Gordon/ Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
22. See R. J. Gordon (1979).
23. The postwar history of the full-employment surplus is given in R. J. Gordon
(1978, p. 491).
24. A concise guided tour of contemporary opinion would include Tobin's
(1953) review of the Patman Inquiry documents, Gurley's (1960) review article
on the Radcliffe Report, Brunner's (1961) review article on the Report of the
Commission on Money and Credit, and Harry Johnson's (1962) review article on
monetary theory and policy. Prior to the publication of the Friedman-Schwartz
monetary history (1963), probably the most influential pieces by Friedman were
his original policy statement (1948), the book with his student that helped to
revive a new version of the quantity theory (1956), the article on money demand
that minimized the role of the interest rate (1959), and the work with Meiselman
that set the quantity theory in competition with the Keynesian multiplier approach
(1963).
25. A concise contemporary critique of those who opposed flexible monetary
policy is contained in Friedman (1951).
26. The velocity of M2 was 2.38 in 1960, and 2.43 in 1977. Afterwards velocity
rose to 2.51 in 1978 and 2.59 in 1979:3. An adjusted measure of M2 that incor-
porates financial innovations in the late 1970s retains the earlier characteristic of
constant velocity—see R. J. Gordon (1979a).
27. Nevertheless, Clark (1979) has recently concluded that the simple acceler-
ator theory outperforms other theories of investment behavior that emphasize the
importance of changing interest rates and tax incentives.
28. A diagrammatic illustration of "crowding out" in 1966 is provided in R. J.
Gordon (1978, pp. 127-29).
29. The extremes in the four-quarter change in the GNP deflator over the
1957-67 period were a peak of 3.9 percent in 1957:1, trough of 1.3 percent in
1958:3, peak of 2.4 percent in 1959:2, trough of 0.6 percent in 1961:1, peak of
2.1 percent in 1962:4, and trough of 1.3 percent in 1964:1, peak of 3.7 percent
in 1966:4, and trough of 2.5 percent in 1967:2. The 1961-62-64 fluctuation pro-
vides part of the foundation for the current econometric conclusion that part of
the influence of demand on prices represents the effect of the rate-of-change of
output, not just the size of the output gap, as shown in R. J. Gordon (1979a).
The same paper examines implications of econometric estimates from the 1954-77
period for economic policy in 1979-80.
30. Edmund Phelps reports that his first (1967) paper was written in the first
half of 1966.
31. We note that real federal expenditures on goods and services rose by 6.1
percent between the 1957:3 peak cyclical quarter and 1958:4, and then declined
by 6.4 percent between 1958:4 and 1960:1. Perhaps more surprising and remark-
able is the record of state-local real spending on goods and services, with a 12.6
percent expansion in the first period and only a 0.5 percent rise in the second
period, a record that presumably reflects the influence of monetary policy on state-
local spending rather than any conscious attempt to pursue an activist counter-
cyclical policy. The combined effect of government spending was thus strongly
stabilizing, and I believe that the negative correlation of real GNP and real gov-
ernment spending during this episode accounts for much of the finding in reduced-
form "St. Louis regressions" of GNP on money and government expenditures that
fiscal policy is impotent. In my 1971 article I drew attention to the stabilizing role
of government spending in 1958 and the negative correlation of private investment
and government spending in 1953-55 as events that explain the low multipliers on
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of the consequences of endogenous monetary and fiscal policy for such equations
is presented by Goldfeld and Blinder (1972).
32. See Bach (1971, p. 100), and R. A. Gordon (1974, pp. 133-36).
33. I have previously (1970, pp. 501-5) presented in more detail the argument
that the lack of careful specification of the role of monetary policy in contempo-
rary econometric models was directly to blame for the excessive rate of monetary
expansion in 1968.
34. Phelps (1967) and Friedman's December 1967 Presidential Address to the
American Economics Association made essentially the same point. Although Fried-
man's presentation had a greater impact and was responsible for the coinage of
the "natural rate" terminology, Phelps' 1968 paper attracted considerable attention
at the August, 1967, conference of the American Bankers Association.
35. Credit for the distinction between the investment dependence on the real
interest rate and money-demand dependence on the nominal interest rate belongs
with Mundell (1963).
36. If the auto output figures for 1970:4 and 1971:1 are simply averaged to-
gether to eliminate the effects of the strike, we conclude that real GNP would
have been $9.9 billion higher and real final sales $5.8 billion higher in 1970:4,
thus making aggregate real final sales in that quarter about $4 billion higher than
in the peak 1969 quarter.
37. Thus perhaps Paul Samuelson's old challenge to his students to explain
automobile sales in 1955 should be replaced by a challenge to a newer generation
of econometricians to explain the configuration of investment in 1973:1.
38. In R. J. Gordon (1972, p. 402) I showed that the data points accumulated
during 1969 and 1970 had made the econometric wage equation unable to reject
the hypothesis that past price change fed through completely to wages, i.e., that
the long-run Phillips curve was vertical.
39. Feige and Pearce's (1973) early evaluation that the controls had little effect
on prices was based on the behavior of the CPI. R. J. Gordon (1972) and Blinder
and Newton (1978) based their evaluations on the behavior of the GNP deflator,
especially for the nonfarm sector.
40. These figures come from R. J. Gordon (1978, p. 251), where adjustments
in the figures are explained and citations given.
41. In R. J. Gordon (1979b) the slowdown in productivity growth in the
1966:1 1972:4 period relative to the preceding 1947-65 era is only 0.4 percentage
points once cyclical corrections are made, and this difference is not statistically
significant.
42. Policy actions during this period are examined in detail in Blinder (1979).
43. The major problem for monetarists was the lack of inflation response to
slower monetary growth in 1969-70, thus indicating that the economy's automatic
powers of "self-correction" were weak.
44. Gramlich (1979) provides a clear exposition of what he calls the Gordon-
Phelps model and sets it in the context of a welfare-maximizing policymaker.
Blinder (1980) extends the analysis to deal with alternative OPEC pricing regimes.
45. It is evident from figures 2.1b, 2.2b, 2.3b and 2.4b that changes in real out-
put have preceded price changes, leaving little room for unexpected price move-
ments to explain output changes.
46. The wage and price equations presented in R. I. Gordon (1979a) indicate
that roughly half of the impact of a recession on the inflation process is propor-
tional to the rate of change of unemployment, and the other half to the level of
unemployment relative to natural unemployment. Thus inflation tends to deceler-
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unemployment is falling but still well above the natural rate, inflation tends to be
relatively constant, as in 1961-63 and 1976-77.
47. See Denison (1979) for the widest ranging discussion of the problem. Other
papers either appear in or are cited in the second 1979 issue of the Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity.
48. Symptomatic of the new concern was the press attention given to Vogel
(1979).
49. For such econometric evaluations, see Eckstein (1978). Other studies are
discussed in Blinder (1979).
50. A discussion of fiscal devices to offset supply shocks is contained in R. J.
Gordon (1975a, pp. 194-96). An early advocate of a tax on imported oil to ex-
tract part of OPEC's monopoly profit was Houthakker (1976).
2. Arthur M. Okun
Postwar Macroeconomic Performance
I would emphasize the following salient features of the postwar macro-
economic record:
1. Throughout the postwar era, real economic activity has displayed
much more stability than it did in earlier United States history.
2. For the first twenty or twenty-five years of the postwar era—but
not since then—that greater stability was accompanied by more rapid
progress with especially strong growth of both output and productivity.
3. While the superior real performance from the mid-forties to the
mid-sixties was not achieved at the expense of a serious departure from
price stability, the record since then shows a dramatic and unprece-
dented chronic inflation accompanying the deterioration of real per-
formance.
4. In subtle but important ways, both the good news and the bad
news of the postwar era reflect the categorical imperative of policymak-
ing established at the beginning of that era—namely the avoidance of an
encore of the Great Depression.
The Stability of Real Activity
Throughout the postwar era including the seventies, economic activity
has been far more stable than it was in previous United States history.
The standard deviation of real GNP around its growth trend in 1946-76
was about one-fourth as large as it had been in 1900-45, and only half
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as large as in the "golden age" of 1900-16, 1920-29, omitting wartime
and depression years in the prewar era (Baily 1978). The contrast in
the cyclical chronology is equally striking: the average duration of busi-
ness-cycle expansions between 1854 and 1937 was twenty-six months,
and that of recessions twenty-one months. From 1945 to 1975, expan-
sions averaged forty-eight months in length and recessions, eleven
months. Thus, the economy spent only 19 percent, rather than 45 per-
cent, of the elapsed time in recession. The longest and deepest postwar
recession (1973-75) was shorter than the median prewar recession and
less severe than four of the nine recessions of the 1900-38 period.
This quantum jump in stability—this taming of the business cycle—
must, in my judgment, be credited to public policy. It was made in
Washington. I suspect that the largest single stabilizing development
stemmed from a change that was not designed to enhance macroeco-
nomic stability, namely the increased size of the public sector as a share
of GNP. That compositional shift created a large component of the total
economy that was not sensitive to cyclical fluctuations and that resisted
multiplier-accelerator interactions. On the income side, the counterpart
to the growth in the public sector was the increase in marginal tax rates,
which cut the size of investment multipliers. The growth of transfer pay-
ments also created important automatic stabilizers: unemployment in-
surance benefits alone have bolstered private purchasing power during
recession periods by more than the total of discretionary stimulative
fiscal actions of the postwar era. The absence of the financial panic
element that was a hallmark of prewar recessions reflects, in part, the
development of federal deposit insurance and other types of federal
financial regulation as well as the willingness and ability of the Federal
Reserve to contain the ripple effects of major failures and defaults.
Private decision makers gradually realized that the government had
the tools of demand management to prevent catastrophes of depression
magnitude. And that recognition helped to alleviate, and ultimately to
end, the fears of an encore of the thirties, which were intense at the
beginning of the postwar era. The perceived reduction of catastrophe
risks, in turn, contributed to less volatile shifts by decision makers in
response to those fluctuations that did emerge, as Baily suggests.
Fiscal and monetary policy were geared up appropriately to avoid
catastrophes, but their record in dealing with the relatively minor acci-
dents that in fact occurred is mixed. Gordon ably traces that experience
in his background paper. I shall merely underline a few of the lessons.
Some of the better stabilization performances came early in the postwar
era. An appropriately large federal surplus was maintained during 1947
and 1948. In terms of macroeconomic stabilization, the Korean War
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—presenting a sharp contrast with the subsequent Vietnam experience.
But, during recession periods, fiscal policy was uniformly slow on the
trigger. Indeed, it is fair to conclude that no significant discretionary
stimulative fiscal action was adopted while the economy was still in
recession. A borderline case was the tax cut enacted in March 1975,
which was the month of the business-cycle trough. Most of the strongly
stimulative fiscal actions were taken in the first year of recovery. On
occasions, these worked effectively to promote the restoration of pros-
perity; on others, they may have overdone the job—providing a stimulus
that was too much too late. Antirecessionary expenditure programs like
public works seem to have operated with a lag of half a cycle. (It may
be easier to stretch the lag to a full cycle than to cut it appreciably!)
The outstanding applications of restrictive budgetary policy occurred
in the fiscal years 1957, 1960, and 1974. And all of these were cases of
too much too late. At the end of the fiscal years 1957 and 1960, celebra-
tions on the achievement of federal budgetary surpluses were followed
immediately by mourning over the onset of recession. The lessons in-
ferred from those experiences contributed to the general acceptance of
federal deficits as a normal and appropriate state of affairs in the sixties
and the seventies.
Monetary policy as well was too slow on the trigger in reacting to
recessions. The growth rate of money remained below average right
through the trough of most recessions, even in those cases when (as
Gordon emphasizes) it accelerated relative to the peak of the previous
expansion. Often, like fiscal policy, monetary policy turned markedly
expansionary during the first year of recovery. A generally accommodat-
ing stance was maintained for too long during several expansions, fol-
lowed by shifts to restraint that were too much too late.
The record provides some illuminating examples of bad and good
applications of the fiscal-monetary mix. In the face of the massive fiscal
stimulus of butter and Vietnam guns, the Federal Reserve in 1966-67
demonstrated that it could do the whole macro job. Tightening enough
to generate a virtual cessation of money growth, it achieved a nonreces-
sionary slowdown that cooled inflation. But the macro success was ac-
companied by serious micro distortions: a collapse in homebuilding, an
acute mortgage famine, a general contraction of availability in credit
markets, and major capital losses on bonds and equities. Then in late
1967 and 1968, monetary policy was clearly too stimulative because the
Federal Reserve refused to risk an encore of these distortions. A good
mix performance is illustrated by the 1964-65 tax cuts, when fiscal pol-
icy played an active role and monetary policy carried an accommodative
role. That strategy was superior to the alternatives of relying on a uni-
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case, in order to provide an equivalent stimulus, interest rates would
have had to be reduced substantially, thereby risking an overstimulus to
homebuilding and exacerbation of the balance-of-payments problem.
I read the undistinguished record of cyclical stabilization as suggest-
ing ample opportunities for improvement. We have to try harder—not
cease the effort.
Deteriorating Growth Performance
Until recently, the greater stability of the postwar era was accom-
panied by more rapid progress. The average annual growth rate of real
GNP was 3.8 percent from 1948 to 1973, far surpassing the average
rate of 2.8 percent for 1909-29 and 2.3 percent for 1929-48. Moreover,
when allowances were made for the size of the "net gap" under these
trend lines connecting prosperity years, the superiority of postwar per-
formance is even clearer: the net gap averaged zero for 1948-73; it
averaged 5 percent of GNP in 1909-29 and 12 percent of GNP in
1929-48. Finally, output per hour worked rose at an average rate of 3
percent per year through most of the postwar era, a substantial improve-
ment over the 2 percent par for the course in the earlier periods.
For 1973-78, however, the annual growth rate of real GNP averaged
only 2.5 percent. And that growth was accomplished only as the result
of an especially rapid increase in the labor force and employment, while
the trend growth of output per hour worked apparently slowed to a mere
one percent a year. The productivity slowdown has generated a vast
amount of interesting economic research, which is often inconclusive.
One important consensus finding is that slower growth of capital per
unit of labor accounts for part but only part of the slowdown. That
slower growth of the capital-labor ratio in turn has two components. If
the ratio of investment to GNP in recent years had matched its historical
average, the capital-labor ratio would have displayed unusually slow
growth in view of the especially rapid growth of the labor force. In fact,
in the latter part of the 1973-75 recession and for some considerable
time in the subsequent recovery, the ratio of business fixed investment
to GNP ran considerably below its historical average.
Chronic Inflation
The other outstanding dimension of deteriorating economic perfor-
mance in recent years is the rapid and accelerating pattern of inflation
since the mid-sixties. The chronic inflation that has survived slack and
recession is an unprecedented experience for Americans. Fourteen years
ago, when the United States economy (and, incidentally, the reputa-
tion of economists) looked brightest, Gardner Ackley (1966, p. 176)
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slack. Managing high-level prosperity is a vastly more difficult business
and requires vastly superior knowledge." The price record demonstrates
that we have not had the skill to manage high-level prosperity.
Actually, in terms of the ability of the federal government to forecast
and control the course of nominal GNP, demand management has been
especially successful in the past decade. The official annual "Troika"
forecasts of nominal GNP were distinctly more accurate in the seventies
than they had been in the sixties—with an average absolute error of
0.75 percent compared to 1.3 percent. (This brings up to date a fact
previously noted by William Fellner. I assure you that the improvement
should not be attributed to a lower quality of the people doing the
Troika forecasting in the sixties!)
In fact, control over nominal GNP is all that monetary and general
fiscal policy can be expected to achieve. They cannot control the "split"
of the growth of nominal GNP between its real and its inflation compo-
nents. But errors in forecasting the split have been serious and costly.
In 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974, and 1979, inflation was wmferpredicted by
a percentage point or more while the growth of real GNP was overpre-
dicted by a point or more. The year 1974 is the most egregious case: the
nominal GNP forecast was nearly perfect, with offsetting errors of about
two and a half percentage points each for the GNP deflator and real
GNP.
The big errors in assessing the split stemmed initially from continued
econometric reliance on the short-run Phillips curve. It was hard to cast
aside a tool that had traced the United States record so well from 1954
through the late sixties. And it was easy to ignore the Friedman and
Phelps attack on the stability of the short-run Phillips curve, and their
prophetic warning (issued at a time when the Phillips curve was still
performing admirably) that the curve would come unstuck in a pro-
longed period of excess demand. Unfortunately, most of the profession
(including me) took too long to recognize that. Since 1970, the Phillips
curve has been an unidentified flying object and has eluded all econo-
metric efforts to nail it down.
A second major contributor to the split errors was the widespread
misassessment of the inflationary significance of supply shocks, such as
those in food during 1973 and in fuel during 1974 and 1979. Paradoxi-
cally, the theory that correctly predicted the shifting Phillips curve im-
plied incorrectly that the rising prices of these items would be offset by
reductions in other prices—with no significant effect on the price level
at given utilization rates. Indeed, it is now clear that the shocks generate
not merely a "one-shot" rise in the price level but a further inflationary
chain reaction through the influence of consumer prices on wages. Here
again, the policymakers and much of the profession ignored timely warn-167 Postwar Macroeconomics: The Evolution of Events and Ideas
ings and constructive policy prescriptions, offered, in this case, by Gor-
don, Perry, and me.
The third major source of split errors was the inadequate recognition
of the inertial patterns of wages (and prices) in the sectors governed by
implicit and explicit contracts. The experience of 1974-75 reinforced
previous evidence that the first-year effect of cutting nominal GNP by
$1 is a reduction between 100 and 200 in the inflation bill and a reduc-
tion in output between 800 and 900. The stark verdict emerges that,
unless that split can be improved, an attack on inflation pursued solely
by monetary-fiscal restraint would cost roughly $200 billion of produc-
tion per point of reduction in the inflation rate.
Policymaking has suffered even more from an incorrect qualitative
assessment of the broader implications of inflation than from the quan-
titative errors in forecasting inflation. The costs of perceived inflation
are not extra trips to the bank, as most models would have it, but rather
a crawl away from money. The entire system of transactions in the
United States economy has been built on the dollar as a unit of account
and a yardstick. Because the price level at the start of World War II was
just about where it had been at the end of the Civil War, people took
money seriously. The nominal unit became the foundation of our finan-
cial system, our accounting system, our corporate and personal planning
and scorekeeping, our tax system, and our explicit and implicit contracts.
The crawl away from money proceeds along many lines: pressures
for cost-of-living escalators; the erosion of model-year pricing and or-
ders with guaranteed prices at delivery; the scrapping of pricing formulas
that rest objectively on historical costs; the agonizing, slow shift to last
in-first out (LIFO) accounting; and the transformation of capital bud-
geting to incorporate explicit though highly uncertain inflation forecasts.
In asset markets, portfolios shift away from long-term, fixed-interest
nominal assets toward the time-honored refuges from inflation—readily
resalable tangible assets such as real estate, precious metals, and art
objects. But the inflation hedges are far less liquid and involve much
higher transactions costs than do nominal assets. And even the most
sophisticated investor cannot construct a portfolio whose real value will
be neutral with respect to the inflation rate. Moreover, because various
categories of prices and wages respond with differential sensitivity to the
general price level, inflation is inevitably nonneutral in its micro effects:
it must change relative prices and relative wages and must reshuffle real
incomes in an arbitrary and haphazard way.
The obsolescence of the capital invested in the dollar as a yardstick
and the enforced lottery in the income distribution make inflation ex-
tremely unpopular. Yet the government seems incapable of solving the
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inflation will end ultimately only through either a prolonged deep reces-
sion or a prolonged application of stultifying price and wage controls.
In this environment of uncertain and pessimistic expectations, is it really
a mystery why common stocks are depressed, why capital spending is
not ebullient and why it is focused on short-term projects, or why the
public's confidence in our basic institutional structure and its future has
plummeted?
There are ample grounds for the suspicion (previously voiced by
Denison and Fellner) that various aspects of our chronic inflation may
account for some of the puzzle of the productivity slowdown. In coping
with the uncertain value of the dollar, buyers and sellers face genuine
increases in their real transactions costs. Managerial effort is diverted
from the promotion of productivity to the development of nonmonetary
yardsticks. The search for inflation hedges may distort the composition
of investment. Uncertainty shrinks the time horizon and creates an aver-
sion to long-lived projects, which may embody particularly large ele-
ments of technical change. Research and development budgets may get
squeezed as well in an era of mounting inflation for the same reason that
desserts vanish from table d'hote dinners. These are all conjectures, but
they deserve serious investigation in the continuing effort to resolve the
productivity puzzle.
A Concluding Perspective
The postwar era began with widespread anxiety about a relapse into
another Great Depression. The categorical imperative of policy was to
avoid such a relapse; and the success must be measured, not in dollars
of real GNP, but in the very survival of United States capitalism. The
formulators of the Employment Act of 1946 focused on avoiding catas-
trophe, but they achieved much more than that: the taming of the busi-
ness cycle.
Did the crusading zeal to prevent depression bring on the subsequent
disease of chronic inflation? Not in the gross ways sometimes alleged.
The economy was not generally overheated: Gordon shows a net aver-
age gap of real GNP in each of the three postwar decades, relative to
his estimates of the "natural" unemployment rate. Nor were investment
and saving shortchanged in favor of public or private consumption: the
ratio of business fixed investment to GNP compares favorably with the
prewar era, and the ratio of gross private saving to GNP in years of
prosperity has faithfully obeyed Denison's Law. (I note with envy that
that is the one law of an economist that survived the seventies.)
But, in subtle ways, I believe that depression mentality fostered infla-
tion vulnerability. There was an imbalance in policy: it is inconceivable
that a four-year recession would have been tolerated in the way that a
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is made depression-proof and deflation-proof, private expectations and
conventions become asymmetrical, introducing an inflationary bias into
the system. Moreover, there was an asymmetry in the development and
deployment of the macroeconomics: our analysis of the determinants
of employment and output was and remains far superior to our under-
standing of fluctuations in the price level and their consequences. There
was an imbalance, and it must be corrected through greater emphasis
on the price level in the economic policymaking (and the economic
analysis) of the eighties.
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3. Herbert Stein
Changes in Macroeconomic Conditions
One of the changes that has come over macroeconomics in the postwar
period is indicated by the fact that this session is the last on the pro-
gram. Surely that would not have happened ten or fifteen years ago.
Then macroeconomics was the centerpiece of economics. It was the
thing we understood and knew how to manage. Now we know that we
don't do it very well, either as science or as policy. Moreover, and this
is more important for economists, the suspicion is growing that there
may not be any macroeconomics. Macroeconomics may only be a lot of
microeconomics, the statistically aggregated consequences of microeco-
nomic decisions.
Despite these uncertainties, I will talk about what we have been talk-
ing about as macroeconomics for the past thirty or forty years. I would
like to relate some of the experiences of one who has been preaching
macroeconomic policy during the whole postwar period under review
here and from that standpoint explain some of the changes that have
occurred in common thinking about the subject. I shall start with the
early statements about macroeconomic policy by the Committee for Eco-
nomic Development, which is a convenient approach for several reasons.
The timing is appropriate because these statements came out mostly in
the years from 1944 to 1948. The statements were more explicit in their
economic and political reasoning than most of that time. They were
representative of a certain school of thought, which used to be calle'd
"modern conservative" or some such combination of words, and the
evolution of this brand of thinking is itself a matter of some contempo-
rary interest. Also, of course, I have more personal contact with this
body of thought than with any other of that period.
We were, in the first place, obsessed with the unemployment problem
and with high employment as a target of economic policy. This was, of
course, the common condition, and the Committee for Economic Devel-
opment (CED) was less obsessed than others. In fact, after the earliest
statements the CED always insisted on using the term "high employ-
ment" rather than "full employment," because full employment seemed
too ambitious an objective, entailing too much danger of inflation and
of government intervention in the free market. Nevertheless, CED did
accept the primacy of the employment objective. For example, when it
wrote about reform of the tax structure it called its proposal a tax pro-
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gram for high employment, and it discussed international economic
policy with primary emphasis on its effects on domestic employment.
Moreover, the CED, like almost everyone else at the time, believed
that the condition of high employment could be defined by a single
statistic, the unemployment rate as then measured, and that the rate
corresponding to high employment would, for all practical purposes,
remain constant. They also thought that they knew what the number
was, within a narrow range. When the committee was working on its key
statement on budget policy, which called for running a small surplus at
high employment, it debated whether it should define high employment
as 4 percent or 5 percent unemployment. Almost twenty years had
passed since the last period of extended peacetime high employment,
and we had no reliable employment-unemployment statistics for the ear-
lier periods. All we had were some horseback estimates by Sumner
Slichter that the sum of seasonal and frictional unemployment would be
4 percent of the labor force. This was not, however, compelling evi-
dence, and the committee could just as well have said 5 percent as 4
percent. The way the committee picked on 4 percent illustrates how
such things are done by practical people. The committee wanted to rec-
ommend that there should be a surplus at whatever level of employment
it defined as high employment. The reason it felt obliged to recommend
a surplus was that it wanted to recommend use of the cash-consolidated
budget, rather than the administrative budget which excluded the trust
accounts and which was in more common use. But if it recommended
only balancing the cash-consolidated budget it would be accused of want-
ing a deficit in what many people still considered the true budget, and
the committee was unwilling to face that. But, given its desire to show a
moderate surplus, doing that at 5 percent unemployment would require
higher tax rates than doing it at 4 percent unemployment, and the com-
mittee, which included some big taxpayers, was unwilling to recommend
higher taxes. So they settled for 4 percent unemployment as the defini-
tion of high employment.
This was one of the early identifications of 4 percent unemployment
as the high employment target and was, I think, highly influential. By
the mid-1950s, and possibly earlier, this number had become firmly
established in public thinking, for no other reason, as far as I can see,
than that it was conventional and to challenge it was to risk being called
hardhearted. This fixation on the 4 percent unemployment rate, from
which we became liberated only slowly, and are not yet fully freed, has
been a major obstacle to clear thinking about macroeconomic policy
during the years when I was in the government as well as at other times.
Of course, we later learned that, whatever confused idea we may have
had about the meaning of high employment at the beginning, we had no
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4 percent, it undoubtedly changed, and increased, substantially after
1955. Moreover, the changes resulted not only from exogenous forces
but also from policy measures, like unemployment compensation. More-
over, the amount of misery connected with unemployment, and the feel-
ing of guilt and responsibility on the part of the community as a whole,
all changed. We also came to see that the measurement of unemploy-
ment, as disclosed by our survey techniques, had little economic signifi-
cance and that the distinction between being unemployed and being out
of the labor force was slight.
For all of these reasons the use of unemployment as a target of mac-
roeconomic policy became much more controversial, uncertain, and ad
hoc than it had seemed to us in 1947. In fact, subsequent developments
raise the question whether we did not make a fundamental mistake then
in taking unemployment or any other real magnitude as a target of
macroeconomic policy. We would probably have done better to fix our
attention on stabilizing some nominal variable, like nominal GNP or the
price level or the rate of change of either. If we had done that the
market would have given us whatever rate of employment could be
permanently achieved and we would have escaped the inflationary con-
sequences of trying to achieve an employment rate that was not perma-
nently sustainable.
Contrary to the impressions given by some recent writing, the people
of the early postwar period knew that the economy grows, that its
growth is a good thing and that its growth can be influenced by public
policy. That is, they were not ignorant of the supply side of the econ-
omy, even though they were understandably preoccupied, after the 1930
experience, with getting the supply utilized.
The attitudes of the CED differed from presently fashionable notions
about the supply side in important respects. CED regarded the demand-
side and supply-side problems as existing in two separate boxes. The
demand-side problem was one of short-run stabilization. The CED did
not believe that any significant contribution to the short-run problem
could come from the supply-side measures because their effects would
be too small and too slow.
Businessmen have a strong propensity to argue for supply-side solu-
tions to demand-side problems because they like to argue that if you
will cut taxes on us we will produce more and that will cure both unem-
ployment and inflation. The supply-side argument is a way of arguing
that what is good for us is good for you. I always remember a discussion
of this at a CED meeting in 1947 or 1948 when some of the business-
men were arguing for productivity-increasing measures as the solution
for inflation. Jacob Viner made what still seems to me the cogent point
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of a pen in one day than all their productivity-increasing effort could do
to check inflation in a decade.
In the business community outside the CED and in the Republican
party at that time there were people who took what is now the standard
supply-side view. That is, during the debates over tax reduction they
argued that tax cuts would increase production, cure inflation, prevent
a recession, and raise the revenue. They were Lafferites before there
was a Laffer curve and possibly before there was a Laffer. Insofar as
there was any basis for this, other than wishfulness, it was a romantic
memory of the days of Andrew Mellon, just as today's Lafferism is
based on a romantic memory of the days of John Kennedy. However,
CED did not go along with this.
Even if we leave aside the more extravagant claims of supply-side
economics there are important issues about national policy towards
growth which have persisted throughout the postwar period. These issues
became especially prominent in the late 1950s and early 1960s and have
come to the fore again in the last few years.
Some of you may remember this earlier period when there was a
competition among presidential hopefuls to see who could promise the
highest growth rate. As I remember, the competition was won by Nelson
Rockefeller, who offered 5 percent a year, which did not, however, get
him the presidency. Around this time CED produced a statement on
economic growth which deserves a footnote in the history of economic
thought because Edward Denison did the background research. Drafting
this statement was a long struggle between the businessmen who wanted
to make vague but expansive promises of the addition to growth that
would result from certain policy changes, especially in the field of taxa-
tion, and the economists who were more reserved and skeptical. This
stimulated Denison to try to measure the determinants of economic
growth and led to the Denison studies that are now familiar to all of you.
The first publication of Denison's results was in a paper that he and
I wrote in 1960 for President Eisenhower's Commission on National
Goals. The main point was that the difference between a growth rate of
3 percent and a rate of 4 percent was not one percent as commonly
thought at the time but 33.3 percent. This meant that in some sense we
would have to increase the total of resources devoted to producing
growth—the investment, the research, the education, and so on—by
one-third, which seemed a tall order and raised the question whether it
would be worthwhile. In fact, we concluded in 1960 that making the
American economy grow faster was not one of our top-priority objec-
tives.
This question looks a little different today than it did twenty years
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Today we don't know what we have. One can, I think, make a stronger
case for trying to promote growth now than in 1960. Also, there are a
number of measures that would be desirable on other grounds and that
would also promote growth—such as tax changes to reduce the discrim-
ination against investment and anti-inflationary policy. However, beyond
that it is not easy to find growth-promoting measures that are clearly
worth their cost—especially in view of the mystery about the causes of
the slowdown in productivity growth.
Of course, the big problem which we did not adequately assess in the
immediate postwar years was the inflation problem. It would be wrong
to think that we were unaware of the problem. In fact, much of what we
said was dictated by fear of it. A primary reason for our resistance to
functional finance and discretionary fiscal policy was that, in the politi-
cal process, it would lead to endless inflation. But in our naivete we
meant by endless inflation an endless rise of the price level, not an end-
less increase in the rate of increase of the price level.
Neither were we ignorant of the possibility of having inflation and
excessive unemployment at the same time. The people in CED in the
early days were much impressed with the experience of 1936-37 in this
respect, and one of the first items on CED's research agenda was a study
of what we then called the inflationary dilemma. Our efforts in this field
never came to any fruition, however, because we never discovered any-
thing very convincing, or perhaps because we were too reluctant to say
what had to be said.
But in any case, we thought we were talking about inflation rates of
2 or 3 percent as a possible cost of high employment. I remember an
occasion, I believe in 1950, when Sumner Slichter wrote a newspaper
article saying that we should accept an inflation rate of 3 percent in
order to have high employment. To the CED this was shocking, and
also embarrassing because Slichter was chairman of our Research Advi-
sory Board.
The critical question is how we got from such a situation in which 2
or 3 percent inflation was necessary for high employment, if we were
ever in such a situation, to one in which a much higher and possibly
accelerating rate is necessary. I have not heard anything in yesterday's
or today's discussion of the structure of the American economy to ex-
plain that. I remain of the opinion that the main reason we have such a
high rate of inflation, and find it so difficult to reduce, is that we now
have a history of a high rate of inflation and that the announcement of
government intentions to curb the inflation has little credibility. There-
fore, I think that the early CED emphasis on fiscal and monetary re-
straint against inflation was correct and our mistake was in not realizing
how critical it was. We did not recognize how difficult it would be to
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fore how essential it was not to set foot on that path. This is, to me, a
reminder of how essential it is to get off that path before we move much
further along it.
I must confess that the businessmen who were the members of the
CED had a hankering to deliver sermons about the necessity for business
and labor to behave responsibly, which translated to mean that labor
should not demand such big wage increases. The staff did manage to
keep such sermons muted, at least while I was there, but I nevertheless
regret them.
CED was in those early days a strong believer in the effectiveness of
monetary policy. We felt confirmed in that view by the behavior of the
economy immediately after the war ended. The prevailing expectation
of economists who belittle the importance of money was that there
would be a severe postwar depression. CED held the contrary opinion
that the large stock of money and other liquid assets accumulated during
the war would sustain demand when wartime controls were relaxed.
This turned out to be correct.
Although CED continued to emphasize the role of monetary policy
it never proposed any rule of monetary policy that would complement
the rule of budget policy on which it set so much store. My explanation
for this may be too cynical, but I think not. The difference was that the
businessmen of CED felt themselves to be outside the budget-making
process and unrepresented in it. On the other hand, many of them were
bankers. Many were directors of Federal Reserve Banks. All were
friends of directors. That is, they wanted rules to govern a budgetary
process from which they felt excluded but not to govern a monetary
process of which they felt themselves a part. Still, I think that the logic
of the general CED outlook, with its skepticism of the political process
and mistrust of forecasting, pointed to having a monetary rule as well
as a budgetary rule.
I had an opportunity to observe at first hand the possibility of running
fiscal and monetary policy by rules when I came into the government in
January 1969. Paul McCracken, who was the chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisers, believed in a rule of budget policy much like the
CED rule and he admitted, in an early press conference, to being Fried-
manesque. I agreed with him on both scores. This kind of thinking was
congenial to Mr. Nixon. In fact, he was an early believer in rational
expectations. That is, he didn't believe that the government could fool
the private sector for long.
Nevertheless, as you all know, we didn't follow any consistent rule.
Of course, we weren't responsible for monetary policy, but we had ideas
about it, and we couldn't even keep these ideas in line with any rule.
There were several reasons for this. For one thing, the behavior of the
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we wrote the president a number of memos saying that it would soon
be necessary to get the Federal Reserve to raise the rate of growth of
the money supply from 2 percent to 4 percent a year. But when the re-
vised money supply figures came out in August we learned that they had
been growing at more than 4 percent during the first half, which gave
us the feeling of shooting at an erratically moving target.
There were, however, more important difficulties.
First, while you can show advantages to staying on a steady fiscal
monetary path once you are on it, if you are not on it or have never
been on it the movement to the path is not prescribed by the rule, and
it rarely seems a good time to make that movement.
Second, even though one can demonstrate that adherence to some
rule may give the best results on the average over a long period of time
the policymaker is responsible for only a short period of time and the
temptation to try to beat the system and do better than the rule during
that period is irresistible.
Third, in our case, after the president was led by George Shultz to
enunciate a rule of budget policy something like the old CED rule,
which unfortunately caused Mr. Nixon to announce that he was now a
Keynesian, that rule found no support in the country. The business and
financial leaders, who should have welcomed the rule, hooted and hol-
lered that it was just an excuse to run a deficit and returned to muttering
about balancing the budget.
Fourth, this left the administration all alone, deserted by the fiscal
conservatives and attacked by the Democrats and most economists in
1972 for not expanding the economy fast enough. The pressure to bend
a rule which nobody but us cared about was too strong.
I do not say these things to excuse our failure to make a more deter-
mined effort to establish durable rules of fiscal and monetary policy but
rather to try partially to explain it. Our experience with rules of macro-
economic policy raises one of the two main questions I would like to
close with. I think that the history of the past twenty years shows the
need for rules and limits of policy to be even greater than it seemed in
the early postwar days. That is because the cure of inflation is now very
much tied up with the credibility of policy. It will be necessary now not
only to follow an anti-inflationary policy but also to convince the coun-
try and the world that we will follow such a policy continuously. The
question is how can we show that. How can we establish new rules
of policy and show that we will stick by them? Is there any middle
ground between completely ad hoc discretionary policy and constitu-
tional amendments that, even if they could be achieved, would be much
cruder than we would like? Is it possible to achieve a degree of public
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ship which will support a consistent credible policy? I don't know the
answer to that.
My second and final question, which I can't answer either, is whether
it is possible to preserve the free economic system by moderation and
gradualism. The basic philosophy of CED in its early days was that it
would sustain the free system by correcting its defects and abandoning
its shibboleths. Thus, we would abandon traditional rules of budget
balancing in order to help stabilize the system. We would support a pro-
gressive income tax in order to make the system more acceptable to the
public. We would seek responsible—i.e., nonmarket—behavior of labor
and business in order to forestall government controls.
Arthur Smithies once said that we in the CED were Fabians. He
meant, I believe, that we, like the Fabians, were going to socialism
slowly. The Fabians wanted to get there and the CED did not want to
get there. But the end would be the same, and CED would have helped
to reach it. CED's budget rule would not have prevented fine tuning but
would have paved the way for it. CED's concession to progression in the
tax system would have legitimized demands for more. CED's talk about
responsible private behavior would have provided the rationale for con-
trols and quasi controls.
I don't know whether another strategy would have been more effec-
tive. Would a more extreme and doctrinaire stance have slowed down
the trend of policy to which many around this table have objected in the
last two days or would it simply have left the arena of decision making
exclusively to those who preferred that trend? On another day I would
like to hear some wise discussion of that question.
Summary of Discussion
Alan Blinder noted that the links between inflation and relative price
changes occur in two directions. Inflation probably changes relative
prices, for as Okun has indicated, some prices can adjust more rapidly
than others. But on the other hand, relative price changes, such as the
oil price increase, also tend to exacerbate inflation. There is a facile
tendency, Blinder indicated, to blame inflation for the costs of the rela-
tive price change. Blinder also held that indexation in the tax rules and
the financial system could substantially reduce the costs of inflation and
make it easier to fight inflation through contractionary policy.178 Robert J. Gordon/Arthur M. Okun/Herbert Stein
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